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COMMENTS
THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE UNDER
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE
V. REID: AN ARTIST'S FAIR
WEATHER FRIEND
Copyright law protects creative people' by assuring them certain valua-
ble rights in their work product.2 Section 201 of the Copyright Act of
1. The terms "creative person" or "artist" are used throughout this Comment to refer
to all artists, defined by the National Endowment for the Arts as "Actors, Architects, Au-
thors, Dancers, Designers, Musicians/Composers, Painters/Sculptors, Photographers, Ra-
dio/TV Announcers, Teachers of Art, Drama or Music in Higher Education, and Other
Artists not elsewhere classified." NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, FIVE YEAR
PLANNING DOCUMENT: 1986 - 1990 83 (1984). In addition, for the purposes of this Com-
ment, the terms "artist" and "creator" are meant to include computer programmers.
2. An artist who owns his or her work has the same "bundle of rights" as any other
owner of property: the right to use the work, to possess it, to conceal it from others, and to
sell or give it away. LEONARD D. DuBoFF, ART LAW 185 (2d ed. 1993); see also Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509-10 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(describing the rights associated with property ownership). These possessory rights are
generally inadequate for artists, however, because most artists sell their works, and the
possessory rights are transferred to the purchasers of the works. See DuBoFF, supra, at
185. Copyright law compensates for this shortfall by granting artists an intangible property
right in their works, apart from possessory rights. See House COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
87TH CONG., 1sT SEss., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL RE-
VISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter REGIS-
TER'S REPORT].
Copyright basically is the right of an author to control, and to prevent, the reproduction
of his work. See id. When the author physically possesses his or her work, the author can
control the use of the work by virtue of tangible property law. See id. However, if the
author makes his or her work available to the public, he or she runs the risk that someone
will reproduce the work without permission. See id. Copyright law allows the author to
control the reproduction of his or her work even after it has been published. See id. Copy-
right law is based on the notion that a person who endeavors to create something, tangible
or intangible, is entitled to exploit that creation commercially, regardless of ownership of
the work itself. See D.F. Libling, Note, The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles,
94 L.Q. REv. 103, 104 (1978).
Congress's authority to grant copyright derives from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion, which states that Congress may "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution therefore
suspends copyright law between the poles of encouraging artistic creation and restricting
the artist's monopoly in the work. See Marci A. Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works
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1976 (1976 Act)3 vests copyright ownership, with all of its benefits, in the
author or authors of a work.4 Because "author" is a term of art under the
1976 Act, however, not all creators are considered copyright authors.' In
particular, under the "work made for hire" doctrine,6 "the employer or
Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1281, 1282 (1987); see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (arguing that Congress constitutionally may grant a monopoly to art-
ists as an economic incentive to artistic creation); cf Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REv. 281, 283-84 (1970) (arguing that the copyright monopoly is generally un-
necessary in the publishing industry and that copyright protection should be recognized
with caution).
As expressed in the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright law strikes the delicate balance be-
tween creation and monopoly by granting an artist exclusive rights in his or her work only
for a limited time. See DuBoFF, supra, at 185. The law allows artists to continue to profit
from their works after they no longer possess copies of them, by prohibiting others from
copying, adapting, distributing, performing, or displaying their works. See id This crea-
tion of a "limited monopoly" in an art work assures that others will not be able to profit
unfairly from the labor of an artist, and further that artists as a whole will be encouraged to
continue to enrich the public with their works. Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, EcoNoMIc
ANALYSIS OF LAW 38-45 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that a copyright operates as a monopoly to
encourage productivity, but is limited in duration to foster competition); REGISTER'S RE-
PORT, supra, at 6 (recognizing that while some restrictions on copyright ownership are
necessary to protect the public, they should not be so oppressive that artists are not com-
pensated fairly for their work).
3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
4. See id. § 201(a). The Initial Ownership section states: "Copyright in a work pro-
tected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a
joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work." Id.
An author is "one who translates an original idea into a fixed, tangible means of expres-
sion." Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted). In
most cases, the author of a copyrightable work is also the creator of the work. See WIL-
LIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRAcTICAL GUIDE 35-36 (4th ed. 1994). Gen-
erally, the initial copyright owner is the creator of the copyrighted work. See Matthew R.
Harris, Note, Copyright, Computer Software, and Work Made for Hire, 89 MICH. L. REv.
661, 661 (1990).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). This section provides:
(b) Works Made for Hire. - In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.
Id.
6. The term "work made for hire" is defined as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a col-
lective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test,
as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire.
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other person for whom the work was prepared," and not the artist, will be
considered the work's author,7 and will be entitled to all of the rights
appurtenant to authorship of a copyrighted work.8
In addition to determining initial authorship, work for hire law impacts
several other aspects of copyright ownership.9 For example, once a work
is determined to be a work for hire, the duration of its copyright, 10 the
Id § 101.
The work for hire doctrine was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). The Bleistein Court was persuaded
that the works in question were produced by paid employees and awarded copyright own-
ership to the employers. See id. at 248. Congress later accepted and codified the work for
hire doctrine. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). There are two reasons for Congress's decision to classify
employers in work for hire situations as authors rather than owners, or some other less
artificial designation. First, the Constitution allows Congress to grant copyright ownership
only to "[a]uthors." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 246-47 (4th ed. 1993). Second, because of the
many benefits associated with authorship and not with mere ownership, Congress desig-
nated employers as authors for purposes of work for hire. See Karen L. Gulick, Creative
Control, Attribution, and the Need for Disclosure: A Study of Incentives in the Motion Pic-
ture Industry, 27 CoNN. L. REV. 53, 62-63 (1994).
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
Of course, copyright ownership also may change where there is no work for hire agree-
ment. See generally STRONG, supra note 4, at 59-63. For example, an author may transfer
his or her copyright to a third party by means of an assignment or licensing agreement. See
id. at 60. Such rights-acquisition agreements may be used when a work, such as a film or
play, is based upon an existing work, such as a novel. See KENNETH P. NORWICK & JERRY
SIMON CHASEN, THE RIGHTS OF AUTHORS, ARTISTS, AND OTHER CREATIVE PEOPLE 114
(2d ed. 1992). In these cases, the purchaser may secure nearly all the rights in the work,
although the author may retain the right to profit from the work in its original form (i.e.
written as opposed to an on-screen performance). See id at 114-15.
9. Besides its significance in American copyright law, the work for hire doctrine has
important consequences in the international copyright area as well. The work for hire
doctrine may conflict with the Berne Convention's emphasis on "rights... deemed to be
personal to the human being who creates a copyrighted work." 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B], at 5-20 n.56 (1996). See infra notes 10-
18 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the work for hire doctrine).
For an unusual use of the work for hire doctrine, see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1993) which asserted, as a defense to a libel suit,
that the offending work was a work for hire and that the defendant writer, because he did
not own the copyright in the work, should not be held liable.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994). For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the
effective date of the 1976 Act, copyright protection endures for the life of the author plus
fifty years. See id § 302(a). The copyright term is different for works for hire, however,
and lasts for seventy-five years from the year of a work's initial publication, or one hun-
dred years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. See id. § 302(c). This
provision is necessary because in work for hire cases, the author is frequently not a person,
but a business entity which has no measurable lifetime. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 137
(1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5753.
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copyright owner's renewal rights," and the owner's right to prevent im-
portation of infringing goods into the United States' 2 are changed. Addi-
tionally, the artist in a work for hire relationship has no transfer
termination rights' 3 because the employer or hiring party'4 is considered
the copyright author.' 5 Finally, an artist's lawsuit for copyright infringe-
ment may be dismissed if the work was for hire because the artist-plaintiff
does not have standing to sue. 16 Because the operation of the work for
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a). Prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act, many works
were still protected under the 1909 Act. See generally GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note
7, at 8-12 (discussing the history of the 1909 and 1976 Acts, and congressional efforts to
protect previously copyrighted works under the 1976 Act). Works created before January
1, 1978 are subject to renewal after the first 28 year term. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(A).
The person entitled to claim the copyright renewal varies depending on whether the work
was for hire. See id § 304 (a)(1)(B); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9,
§ 5.03[A], at 5-11.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 601. An author who is not a citizen or domiciliary of the United
States may not prevent the importation of infringing materials into the country. See id.
§ 601(b)(1). In the case of a work for hire, however, if the employer or commissioning
party is a citizen or resident, the exclusion does not apply. See id. This is appropriate
because, in work for hire cases, the hiring party is the author for purposes of the statute.
See id. § 201(b).
13. A copyright is a form of intangible property; as such it may be sold, given as a gift,
bequeathed by will, or otherwise transferred if the owner so desires. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(d); see also STRONG, supra note 4, at 59. When preparing a contract to transfer
ownership of a copyright, many authors include a provision stating reasons for which the
transfer may be terminated, in which case the copyright would revert to the author. See id.
at 64. Furthermore, the Act gives authors a statutory right of termination. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(a) (providing that "the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of
copyright or of any right under a copyright ... is subject to termination" under several
conditions). Congress found that a statutory right of termination was necessary because of
"the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of
determining a work's value until after it has been exploited." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
124 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740.
14. The terms "hiring party" or "employer" are used throughout this Comment to
refer to "the party who claims copyright ownership under the work for hire doctrine." 1
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 5.03[B], at 5-15 n.27 (1995) (citing Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 n.6 (1989)).
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). Under § 203, an author who has made a grant of rights to a
third party can terminate the transfer after thirty-five years. See id. § 203(a)(3). Artists
often transfer copyright in their work before the true value of the work can be ascertained
(i.e., when the artist is still unknown). See DuBoFF, supra note 2, at 193. Congress en-
acted § 203(a) to allow artists to renegotiate such transfer agreements after they achieve
some renown. See id. This termination right does not apply to works made for hire, be-
cause there is no actual transfer of rights. See supra note 4 (discussing § 201). Instead, the
employer is considered the author of the work from its inception. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
16. In work for hire cases, the artist is not the copyright owner. See supra notes 5-6
and accompanying text (discussing the operation of the work for hire doctrine). Only
copyright owners or their exclusive licensees may sue for copyright infringement. See 17
U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994) ("The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copy-
right is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right com-
mitted while he or she is the owner of it."); see also Corey L. Wishner, Note, Whose Work
[Vol. 46:119
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hire doctrine has many implications,' 7 it is vitally important that artists
and employers alike be able to determine with certainty whether a work
will be considered for hire.' 8
Under the 1976 Act, a work for hire relationship exists when an em-
ployee creates a work "within the scope of his or her employment."' 9
Is It Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid in Defining the
Employer-Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made for Hire" Doctrine, 12 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 393 (1995) (stating that the court must determine the true owner of a copyrighted
work when adjudicating a copyright infringement case). Thus, the employer may sue for
infringement, but the artist-employee may not. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron
Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1990) (allowing the defendant in a copyright
infringement suit to assert that because of the work for hire doctrine, the plaintiff-em-
ployee was not the copyright owner and thus lacked standing to sue); cf. 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 9, § 5.03[A], at 5-11 (noting that a defendant may use the work for
hire doctrine to dispute a plaintiff's copyright ownership).
17. See generally Julie Goldscheid, Copyright Law: Toward an Improved "Works for
Hire" Doctrine, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 557, 558 (1991) (arguing that the application of
work for hire law is particularly important in the publishing, advertising, music, and com-
puter programming industries, as the artists in those fields generally work as independent
contractors).
18. Certainty is essential so that artists and employers or commissioning parties alike
can negotiate with each other with full knowledge of the facts. See Works-Made-For-Hire -
Practical Perspectives: A Roundtable Discussion, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & Awrs 507, 539
(1990) (statement of William Patry) ("[T]he most desirable thing for everybody is that you
know up front what the relationship is going to be and then you can bargain over it ... you
can get these many rights for this much money and that many rights for that much
money.") [hereinafter Works-Made-For-Hire]; see also Christine Leahy Weinberg, Note,
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: A Specious Solution to the "Works Made
for Hire" Problem, 32 B.C. L. REv. 663, 665 (1991) (claiming that "predictability in the
'work for hire' doctrine is critical to the ability of parties to identify the potential and scope
of economic rewards for creative production and to structure contracts concerning copy-
right interests accordingly"). On the other hand, an artist who is aware that his or her
work may be considered for hire may be able to demand additional compensation, because
he or she will not benefit from copyright protection. See Works-Made-For-Hire, supra, at
539. An employer or commissioning party will be able to save the expense of providing
benefits to or withholding taxes for an artist, if the artist is considered an independent
contractor., See id. So long as application of the work for hire doctrine remains uncertain,
artists and employers alike cannot bargain effectively, as they cannot safely predict how a
court will view their employment relationship. See id.
The Supreme Court accepted the importance of predictability when it rejected the actual
control test in Reid because the test "thwart[ed] Congress' goal of ensuring predictability
through advance planning." Reid, 490 U.S. at 749. The Court noted that in a "copyright
marketplace," the artist and hiring party negotiate with the understanding that one of them
will own the copyright in the finished work. See id. at 749-50. If copyright ownership may
be predictably determined, the parties can confidently structure the provisions of their
agreement. See id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1). The 1976 Act actually provides for two kinds of work for hire
situations. The first involves an employee who creates a work within the scope of his or
her employment. See id. § 101(1). The second kind of work for hire is one created by an
independent contractor working in one of several statutorily defined categories, but only if
the artist and hiring party agree in a writing that the work is for hire. See id. § 101(2). This
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Unfortunately, the work for hire doctrine has not been applied uniformly,
largely because the 1976 Act fails to define two key terms: "employee"
and "scope of employment."2 Courts interpreting the work for hire pro-
vision of the 1976 Act have developed their own tests for these terms, and
as a result, artists in different jurisdictions have received varying amounts
of copyright protection.2'
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,22 the Supreme Court
addressed the copyright ownership problem by adopting common law
agency principles for use in work for hire determinations.23 Regrettably,
because Reid adopts a flexible, multi-factor approach,24 it has only par-
tially resolved the controversy. 25 Lower courts applying Reid continue to
Comment focuses particularly on the employment type of work for hire described in
§ 101(1). For a thoughtful discussion of the commissioned artist type of work for hire
relationship embodied in § 101(2), see generally Nancy Barbara Morris, Note, Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: An Incomplete Resolution of the Work for Hire Contro-
versy, 11 PACE L. REv. 167 (1990).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
738 (1989) (observing that the Act does not define "employee" or "scope of employ-
ment"); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 5.03[B], at 5-13 (noting that the text of the
Act and the committee reports fail to define "employee" and "scope of employment");
Weinberg, supra note 18, at 668-85 (describing the history of the copyright work for hire
doctrine and the legislative efforts to clarify the law with the 1976 Act).
21. Compare Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) (noting
that a work is for hire if the hiring party has the right to direct and control the creation of
the work), with Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding that a work is for hire if the hiring party actually exercises the right to direct and
control the creation of the work), and Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th
Cir. 1989) (concluding that a work is for hire only if the artist is a formal, salaried em-
ployee, or if the work is created by an independent contractor and is one of nine kinds of
works enumerated in the Act), and Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-
35 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a work is for hire if the artist is an employee under com-
mon law agency principles, or if the artist is an independent contractor and the work is one
of the kinds of works listed in § 101(2) of the 1976 Act); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 9, § 5.03[B], at 5-26 to 5-27 (describing various tests courts developed in inter-
preting the 1976 Act).
22. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
23. See id. at 740-41.
24. See id at 751-52. After listing factors to be considered in determining whether an
artist has been hired as an employee or as an independent contractor, the Supreme Court
stated that no individual factor would be determinative. See id.
25. Several commentators have argued that a more precise test is necessary. See Ham-
ilton, supra note 2, at 1313 (suggesting that Congress could borrow an employment defini-
tion from another statute); cf. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 5.03[B], at 5-26 n.80
(arguing that only a "completely mechanical definition" would avoid case-by-case adjudi-
cation, and that such a definition, while providing certainty, would be harsh and inequita-
ble in some cases).
[Vol. 46:119
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reach inconsistent results,26 and application of the work for hire doctrine
remains unpredictable.27
This Comment discusses the confusion in copyright law surrounding
the work for hire doctrine that specifically results from Reid's adoption of
common law agency principles. Section I focuses on the conflicting tests
the federal courts developed prior to Reid. Section II analyzes the Reid
decision, focusing on the agency test adopted for work for hire cases. Ex-
amining several work for hire cases decided under Reid, Section III com-
pares the factors the courts have relied upon and discusses the disparate
conclusions they reach. Section IV considers the purposes underlying the
work for hire doctrine and analyzes the state of work for hire law after
Reid. This Comment concludes that, as currently applied, Reid has be-
come merely a "fair-weather friend" to artists and proposes an alterna-
tive interpretation of Reid that considers the interests of both employers
and artists, furthering the objectives of copyright law.
I. THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE PRIOR TO COMMUNITY FOR
CREATIVE NON- VIOLENCE v. REID: STORMY WEATHER
Although federal copyright laws have existed in various forms since
1790,28 a work for hire provision did not appear in statutory form until
26. Compare, e.g., Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 92-463-A, 1994 WL 791188, *8 (E.D.
Va. 1994) (holding that a computer program created by an employee was not a work for
hire), aff d, 67 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1995) with Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238,
1244 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding that a computer program created by an employee was a work
for hire); see infra notes 173-204 and accompanying text (discussing the tests utilized in
Avtec and Miller).
27. See Mary M. Luria & Laura Butzel, Legal Rules Still Hazy On "Work for Hire,"
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at S21 (asserting that regardless of the Supreme Court's decision
in Reid, the classification of work for hire relationships remains unclear); see also Gold-
scheid, supra note 17, at 572 (concluding that the Reid agency approach may be no more
precise than any of the tests previously applied by the courts); cf Alan Hyde & Christo-
pher W. Hager, Promoting the Copyright Act's Creator-Favoring Presumption: "Works
Made for Hire" Under Aymes v. Bonelli & Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 71 DENv. U. L.
REv. 693, 716 (1994) (arguing that the trend of cases decided under Reid, as evidenced by
Aymes and Avtec, is to prefer the interests of the artist over those of the hiring party).
The problem of unpredictability is exacerbated because artists and hiring parties cannot
contractually determine whether the working relationship will be considered one for hire.
See Robert A. Kreiss, Scope of Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-
Made-for-Hire Provision of the Copyright Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests,
40 KAN. L. REv. 119, 145-46 (1991). Courts look to the substance of the working relation-
ship and find that an artist is an employee if the factors so indicate, regardless of any
contractual agreement to the contrary. See id. at 146.
28. The American copyright system is derived from English statutory law. See
GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 1. Following the Revolution, most of the Colonies
enacted laws to protect authors, generally based on the proposition that such protection
was necessary to promote "the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the
1996]
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the 1909 Copyright Act.29 In the 1950s, Congress undertook a substantial
overhaul of copyright law to better adapt it to modem technology.3 ° The
revision process took two decades and resulted in the 1976 Act.3 ' As part
of the revision process, Congress sponsored an official negotiation be-
tween artist and employer representatives that resulted in the work for
hire provisions codified at § 101 and § 201 of the Act.32 Section 101(1) 33
public weal of the community, and the advancement of human happiness." Id. at 5 (quot-
ing Massachusetts, Act of March 17, 1783). The first federal copyright law was the Copy-
right Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). See id. at 6. The 1790 Copyright Act
underwent various revisions for the next one hundred years, until the enactment of the
1909 Copyright Act. See id. at 7-8. The 1909 Copyright Act remained in effect, with minor
amendments, for the next 68 years. See id. at 8.
29. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 668. The 1909 Act stated that "the word 'author'
shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire." Copyright Act of 1909, ch.
320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). The work for hire provision of the Copyright Act of 1909
merely codified the presumption at common law that an employer was entitled to copy-
right ownership in works produced by a salaried employee. See Weinberg, supra note 18,
at 668.
30. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 670-71. The revision process also marked a shift in
the mission of copyright law toward rewarding authors for their contributions to society.
See REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
31. See generally Weinberg, supra note 18, at 670-73. For an in-depth discussion of the
work for hire doctrine as it developed under the 1909 Act, and of the legislative history
surrounding the adoption of § 101 of the 1976 Act, see Weinberg, supra note 18, at 668-84.
Under the 1909 Act, the employer was presumed to be the author of works created by an
employee. See Hyde & Hager, supra note 27, at 716. The 1976 Act essentially terminated
that presumption by limiting commissioned works for hire to the nine exclusive works pro-
vided for in the Act, and by requiring an express written agreement between both parties
agreeing to treat the relationship as for hire. See id.
32. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 670-84 (discussing the legislative history of the
1976 Act and focusing particularly on the compromise nature of the work for hire provi-
sion eventually drafted).
The independent artist's interest in copyright ownership is self-evident. Copyright law
seeks to secure for such artists fair compensation for their creative work. See Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
On the other hand, when the artist is hired to create a work, it may be more appropriate
to award copyright ownership to the employer. See Harris, supra note 4, at 662. Many
times the employer is responsible for undertaking the project. See id. The employer usu-
ally bears the risk of commercial loss if the project is unsuccessful, while the employed
artist is paid no matter what. See id. Awarding copyright ownership to the employer in
this situation helps ensure that the employer will be fairly compensated for its creative
work. See id.; see also Alexandra Duran, Comment, Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence v. Reid: The Supreme Court Reduces Predictability by Attributing an Agency Standard
to the Work for Hire Doctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1082-83
(1990) (stating that the work for hire doctrine balances the rights of independent artists
while rewarding hiring parties for their financial and editorial contributions).
Furthermore, the employer may be better able to disseminate the work, making it more
available for public use. See I.T. Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law's
Work-Made-For-Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 181 (1988).
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1994). The use of subsections (1) and (2) to refer to the
two parts of the work for hire definition in Section 101 of the Act perhaps is confusing.
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provides that an employee-created work is for hire if it has been prepared
within the scope of employment. 34 Section 101(2) provides that a com-
missioned work is for hire when it is one of nine specific types of work
and the parties expressly agree in a signed writing that the work is for
hire.35 Congress's failure to define the critical terms "employee" and
"scope of employment" in the Act has left the problem of interpreting
those terms to the courts.36
Without guidance from the 1976 Act, courts applying the work for hire
doctrine developed various tests, often achieving different results.37 Spe-
cifically, the courts adopted four different tests: the actual control test,
38
Section 101 is actually a collection of definitions which are not individually numbered, and
some definitions found therein contain subsections. Thus, there are in fact several provi-
sions which could be cited as § 101(1) or (2). However, a review of the applicable litera-
ture, including the Supreme Court's decision in Reid, reveals that this convention has been
almost universally adopted, and it will be followed herein.
34. See id. § 101(1). The reasoning behind the employee work for hire rule is that,
because the employer risks its capital, controls the creation process, and pays the artist, the
employer should own the copyright in the artist's work. See Paul D. Supnik, Contracts for
Employment, in THE VISUAL ARTIST'S BUSINESS AND LEGAL GUIDE 135, 139 (Gregory D.
Victoroff ed., 1995).
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). The types of works the section classifies as potential works
for hire are contributions to collective works, parts of motion pictures or other audiovisual
works, translations, supplementary works, compilations, instructional texts, tests, answer
materials for tests, or atlases. See id. The rationale supporting the specially commissioned
works provision is that these works usually involve groups of artists, and it would be unrea-
sonable to require that a hiring party negotiate separately with all of the artists to obtain
copyrights. See Supnik, supra note 34, at 139.
36. See supra note 20 (discussing how the 1976 Act fails to define "employee" and
"scope of employment").
37. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738-39 (1989)
(discussing the various tests developed under the Act); Weinberg, supra note 18, at 666
(noting that the lack of a statutory definition resulted in inconsistent interpretations of the
Act by federal courts).
38. See Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding that if an employer supervised and directed the creation of a work, the work is for
hire even if the artist was an independent contractor); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
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the right to control test,39 the agency law test,4" and the traditional em-
ployee test.4 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed
the actual control test in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.42 Relying
on case law developed under the 1909 Act, the court held that a work
would be considered for hire if the hiring party paid for and controlled
the creation of the work, regardless of whether an artist was an employee
or independent contractor.43 The actual control test interfered with the
crucial predictability of copyright working arrangements by forcing artists
and hiring parties to guess, before undertaking a project, whether enough
control would be exercised to render the project a work for hire.4
39. See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) (concluding
that work was for hire where the hiring party retained the right to supervise the work);
Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (noting that the right of
an employer to direct and supervise work was demonstrative of a work for hire relation-
ship), affd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1493-94 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that a work may be for hire only if created by an employee within the
scope of employment, according to the common law of agency, or by an independent con-
tractor, if the requirements of § 101(2) are met), affd, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); Easter Seal
Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
981 (1988).
41. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that, to be
an employee-created work for hire, a work must be prepared by a formal, salaried
employee).
42. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
43. See id. at 552-53. The Aldon court held that:
A work for hire is a work prepared by what the law calls an employee working
within the scope of his employment. What that means is, a person acting under
the direction and supervision of the hiring author, at the hiring author's instance
and expense. It does not matter whether the for-hire creator is an employee in
the sense of having a regular job with the hiring author. What matters is whether
the hiring author caused the work to be made and exercised the right to direct
and supervise the creation.
Id. at 551.
44. Harris, supra note 4, at 682. The actual control test was very fact specific, so that
different works could be treated differently even though produced by the same artist for
the same hiring party. See id.
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The right to control test was a variation of the Second Circuit's actual
control test.45 In Peregrine v. Lauren Corp.,46 the United States District
Court for Colorado held that a work for hire relationship existed when-
ever an employer retained the right to supervise the creation of the
work.47 Under the test, nearly all commissioned works, even those cre-
ated by independent contractors, could be considered works for hire.48
Applying agency law principles, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit adopted a different work for hire test in Easter Seal Soci-
ety v. Playboy Enterprises .4  Recognizing that § 101 distinguishes be-
tween employees and independent contractors, the court held that agency
principles should resolve whether an artist worked as an employee.50
45. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 687 n.168. Although the tests were similar, the
actual control and right to control tests differed in the kind of control requisite to the work
for hire relationship. See id.; see also Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39. Under the right to control
test, so long as the employer retained the right to supervise creation of the work, he or she
did not need to actually exercise the right. See id. (citing Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F.
Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) and Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)). Under the actual control test, however, the employer must have actually
exercised the right. See id at 739 (citing Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 553).
46. 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985).
47. See id. at 829.
48. See Harris, supra note 4, at 677-78 (maintaining that "few commissioning relation-
ships are entered in which the commissioning party does not retain the right to direct and
control a work"). The actual control test itself may be unsound: a hiring party may not
delegate the right to control unless he or she originally possesses it. See Hardy, supra note
32, at 216-17. Because the hiring party thus retains a residual right to control, under the
actual control test a commissioning party must always be the copyright author. See idt
49. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
50. See id. at 335. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines an employee as a "per-
son employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the
physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right
to control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958). The factors relevant to
the employment issue are:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
0) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id § 220(2).
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Under this test, a commissioned work prepared by an independent con-
tractor could be for hire only if it was one of nine identified types of
works and the parties agreed it was to be considered for hire.5'
Finally, in Dumas v. Gommerman, 2 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit fashioned the traditional employee test. The
court held that an "employee" under the 1976 Act meant a formal, sala-
ried employee and did not include free-lance creators.5 3 This traditional
employee test was the most narrow of the four tests and, because it lim-
ited the work for hire doctrine to the most formal of employment circum-
stances, it increased predictability in artist-hiring party relationships.5"
The various tests the courts used prior to Reid caused problems for
artists and employers alike.55 Despite the importance of predictability in
copyright. law,56 the conflicting tests muddied the work for hire waters,
and interfered with nationwide uniformity of copyright law.57 These con-
The court reasoned that because the term "scope of employment" is a term of art under
agency law, an employee under the 1976 Act would have to be an employee as determined
by the law of agency. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 335-37. Furthermore, the court held that
using agency law to apply the work for hire provisions of the 1976 Act would provide
predictability and "moral symmetry." Id. at 335. By "moral symmetry," the court proba-
bly meant that applying agency principles would best balance the competing interests of
artistic control and employment security.
51. See Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 335-36. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines
an independent contractor as "a person who contracts with another to do something for
him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with
respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958).
52. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 1105.
54. See Harris, supra note 4, at 684.
55. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) ("The
contours of the work for hire doctrine therefore carry profound significance for freelance
creators - including artists, writers, photographers, designers, composers, and computer
programmers - and for the publishing, advertising, music, and other industries which
commission their works."). The Supreme Court also cited a study which found that ap-
proximately forty percent of all copyright registrations as of 1955 were for works for hire.
See id. at 737 n.4 (citing BORGE VARMER, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION,
IN STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMrITEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Study No. 13, 86th Cong., 2d sess.,
139 n.49 (Comm. Print 1960)).
56. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 740 (asserting that reliance on a federal rule of agency, rather
than state law, would better serve the Act's goal of creating nationally uniform copyright
law); Bennett E. Fidlow, The "Works Made for Hire" Doctrine and the Employee/In-
dependent Contractor Dichotomy: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 10 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 591, 616 (1988) (arguing for the importance of predictability in work
for hire law).
57. See Goldscheid, supra note 17, at 561 (arguing that predictability and consistency
are decreased if courts apply different tests, and copyright ownership is awarded depending
upon the jurisdiction in which an artist happens to reside); Weinberg, supra note 18, at 685-
86 (recognizing that, although the Act and its legislative history clearly distinguished be-
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flicting tests may have discouraged artistic productivity, because some
artists may have declined commissions for fear of losing copyright.. 8 In
1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the
courts.5 9
II. COMMUNTrY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE V. REID: FORCASTING
FAIR WEATHER
In 1985, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a non-
profit charitable organization, engaged the artist James Earl Reid to cre-
ate a sculpture for CCNV to display.6" After Reid completed the
sculpture and both CCNV and Reid claimed copyright ownership, CCNV
brought suit.61 The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia found that the sculpture was a work for hire based on § 101 of the
1976 Act, holding that Reid created it as an employee of CCNV.62
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded the case. 63  Adopting the Fifth Circuit's
tween employees and independent contractors, courts developed conflicting tests to decide
cases where an artist's employment status was disputed).
58. See Works-Made-for-Hire, supra note 18, at 525 (statement of Martin Mayer)
("My experience in dealing with magazines is that I will not sign work-for-hire things
. ...."); see also Supnik, supra note 34, at 137 (counselling artists to avoid creating works for
hire where possible). Furthermore, extraordinary works of art are susceptible to exploita-
tion by hiring parties, who may desire to use the works for purposes that the parties did not
originally contemplate. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1311. The confusion surrounding
work for hire law thus may have created a "powerful incentive to artists to produce the
absolute minimum work required by the commissioning party." Id. As the underlying
purpose of copyright law is to foster artistic and intellectual development for the good of
the public, uncertainty in work for hire law may undercut the very core of copyright. See
supra note 2 (discussing the objectives of copyright law).
59. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 488 U.S. 940 (1988).
60. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 733. The sculpture, entitled Third World America, depicted a
homeless black family huddled over a steam grating in a pose reminiscent of the Nativity
scene. See Copyright Ruling Favors Artists, ART IN AMERICA, Sept. 1989, at 240. Reid
donated his services to the project, and CCNV paid Reid's expenses. See Reid, 490 U.S. at
734. CCNV exercised some control over the creation of the sculpture, making suggestions
about the placement of the figures and the media to be used. See id.
61. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 735. The dispute over ownership arose because CCNV in-
tended to take the sculpture on a nationwide tour. See id. Reid attempted to block the
proposed tour because he felt the sculpture, which had been cast in inexpensive material to
save costs, could not withstand the trip. See id. The disagreement also may have stemmed
from CCNV's plans to reproduce the sculpture on greeting cards and calendars. See Copy-
right Ruling Favors Artists, supra note 60, at 240.
62. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1457
(D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The court
awarded ownership of the copyright to CCNV. See Reid, 652 F. Supp. at 1467.
63. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1494 (D.C. Cir.
1988). The court determined that, under agency law, Reid was an independent contractor,
not an employee. See id Since a sculpture is not one of the types of works listed in
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agency test,64 the court determined that Reid was an independent con-
tractor and the sculpture was not a work for hire.65
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's opinion.' Because
the sculpture would be a work for hire only if it were "a work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,"67 the Court's
opinion focused on the definition of "employee." The Court concluded
that Congress intended "employee" to refer to the "conventional relation
of employer and employee" found in common law agency principles.68
Because federal statutes typically are intended to be applied uniformly
nationwide,69 the Court created a federal common law of agency, based
on the Restatement (Second) of Agency.70
Reid structured the work for hire inquiry as a two-step test. The first
step is to determine whether, under general agency principles, an em-
ployee or independent contractor created the work in question. 7' The
distinction between employees and independent contractors reflects the
law's sensitivity to employers, who are entitled to the copyright in the
works they have subsidized through the payment of wages and provision
of employment benefits. 72 Further, the law recognizes that an employer
usually supplies guidance and supervision over an employee's work, while
§ 101(2) and there was no writing, the relationship could not have been a work for hire
arrangement under § 101(2). See id.
64. See id. (citing Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334 (5th Cir.
1987)); see also supra note 50 (describing the elements of the agency law test).
65. See Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494. The court remanded the case for a determination as to
whether the sculpture could be considered a joint work. See id.
66. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 (1989).
67. See id. at 738 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1994)). CCNV conceded that sculpture
is not one of the kinds of works listed in § 101(2) and that Third World America could not
be considered a work for hire under that section. See id. In addition, the parties had not
signed a written agreement as required. See id.
68. Id. at 739-41 (quoting Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1974)).
Common law agency principles have been applied in areas other than copyright law. See
Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18, at 510 (statement of Irwin Karp). The National La-
bor Relations Act prevents independent contractors, as defined by agency principles, from
organizing unions. See id. In addition, tax and antitrust laws make distinctions based upon
agency law. See id.
69. Where Congress designates the federal courts as courts of original jurisdiction for
a cause of action, the law the courts apply should be national in scope so that adjudication
of cases will be uniform. See Wishner, supra note 16, at 400-01.
70. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 740-41 (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)).
71. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
72. See Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Librarian's Conference on
Copyright, 2d Sess. (Nov. 1-4, 1905), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT AcT (E. Fulton Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 1976). The Report notes:
[T]he right belonging to that artist who is employed for the purpose of making a
work of art so many hours a day, or that literary producer who is employed for so
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a commissioning party may be relatively unconnected with the work of an
independent contractor.73
Therefore, the primary inquiry under Reid is whether a particular artist
is an employee or an independent contractor.74 Reid set forth several
factors75 relevant to the determination: the hiring party's right to control
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished;76 the skill
many hours, should be very different from the right that is held by the independ-
ent artist or man who makes a painting for art's sake.
Id. at 188 (statement of A. Beverly Smith, Lithographers' Ass'n (East)).
73. See VARMER, supra note 55, at 142.
74. See id.; see also MacLean Assocs. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952
F.2d 769, 776 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the characterization of the employment relation-
ship is the "key inquiry").
75. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. Although Reid cites the factors, it does not explain how
they are to be applied. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that
Reid failed to give direction concerning the balancing of the factors), affd, 47 F.3d 23 (2d
Cir. 1995).
The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Agency do provide some guidance for
relating the factors to the employment determination. According to the comments, the
presence of the following factors signifies an employment relationship:
An agreement for close supervision or de facto close supervision of the servant's
work; work which does not require the services of one highly educated or skilled;
the supplying of tools by the employer; payment by hour or month; employment
over a considerable period of time with regular hours; full time employment by
one employer; employment in a specific area or over a fixed route; the fact that
the work is part of the regular business of the employer; the fact that the commu-
nity regards those doing such work as servants; the belief by the parties that there
is [an employment] relation; an agreement that the work cannot be delegated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. h (1958).
In addition, comment (i) provides that "[tlhe custom of the community as to the control
ordinarily exercised in a particular occupation ... together with the skill which is required
in the occupation, is often of almost conclusive weight." Id. § 220 cmt. i. Therefore, a chef
often would be considered an employee, even though he or she is highly skilled and not
subject to the employer's control, because the community generally believes chefs to be
employees. See id.
Also, if the employer controls the site of the work, then the workers are likely employ-
ees. See id. § 220 cmt. I. Finally, the parties' belief about their relationship is ordinarily
not important. See id. § 220 cmt. m.
Because Reid does not cite to the comments, however, it is questionable whether they
represent any more than persuasive authority for lower courts.
76. See Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318,320-21 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that,
because the employers had no right to control performances by hired musicians, the musi-
cians were independent contractors); NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 133, 135
(1st Cir. 1981) (holding that truck drivers were employees because they were subject to the
control of their employers); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958) (defin-
ing a servant as a person subject to an employer's control).
The right to control necessary to create an employment relationship may be "very atten-
uated." Id. § 220(1) cmt. d; see also Wishner, supra note 16, at 403. The agency test,
however, focuses more on the hiring party's ability to control the worker than the ability to
control the creation of the product. See Kreiss, supra note 27, at 160.
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required;" the source of the instrumentalities and tools;7" the location of
the work;79 the duration of the relationship between the parties;8" the
hiring party's right to assign additional projects to the hired party;8' the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;82
77. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947) (arguing that musicians were
not employees because their musical abilities and performance determined their success);
Hilton Int'l Co., 690 F.2d at 320 (stating that skill may be considered in the agency inquiry);
NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379, 382 (3d Cir. 1979) (arguing that the potential for
additional profits through entrepreneurial skill is a factor in the agency analysis); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(d) (1958) (providing that the skill required in a par-
ticular occupation is a factor to be considered in determining whether a hired party is an
employee).
If the skilled work is ordinarily considered secondary to the business of the hiring party,
it may be inferred that the artist is an employee. See id. § 220(2) cmt. i. The fact that the
artist is a skilled professional, however, weighs against the employer. See Wishner, supra
note 16, at 405.
The level of skill required is not completely clear, but an artist is probably not required
to be a master in his or her field to qualify. See Marco v. Accent Pub. Co., 969 F.2d 1547,
1551 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that a photographer did not have to rival Ansel Adams to be
considered skilled).
78. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (holding that
salespeople were employees in part because they used tools provided by their employer);
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1947) (finding that an employer's provision of
tools was a factor to be considered); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e)
(stating that the identity of the party supplying the tools and work place is a factor in the
agency test).
If an artist uses his or her own tools, he or she is probably not an employee. See
Wishner, supra note 16, at 406-07. On the contrary, where an artist uses the hiring party's
tools, it is expected that he or she will obey the hiring party's instructions regarding use of
the tools. See id. This weighs in favor of an employment relation. See id.; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. k.
79. See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258-59 (asserting that salespeople were considered
employees in part because they worked on employer's premises); Dumas v. Gommerman,
865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the location of the work should be taken
into account); Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986) (not-
ing that the location of the work may be considered in determining whether a right to
control exists), rev'd, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220(2)(e) (same).
80. The shorter the term of the job, the more likely it is that the artist is an independ-
ent contractor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. j.
81. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105 (holding that the employer's right to assign additional
projects suggests that the hired party is an employee); Short v. Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 573-74 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting the employer's control
over substitution of workers and right to refuse work in finding the hired party was an
employee).
82. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105 (relying on the discretion of the hired party in deter-
mining whether he was an independent contractor); Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532,
1539 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same); Darden, 796 F.2d at 705 (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (same).
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the method of payment;83 the hired party's role in hiring and paying as-
sistants;' whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; 5 whether the hiring party is in business; 6 and the tax treatment of
the hired party. 7 No single factor is determinative.88
83. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947) (holding that band leader was
employer because, among other things, he paid musicians' wages and retained profits for
himself); Silk, 331 U.S. at 719 (concluding that drivers were independent contractors be-
cause they worked for profit, not wages); Darden, 796 F.2d at 705 (citing the method of
payment as a factor to be considered); Short, 729 F.2d at 574 (noting that the fact that
workers were paid by commission weighed in favor of independent contractor status). An
employment relationship is less likely if the artist is paid by the job. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. j; Wishner, supra note 16, at 407.
84. See N.L.R.B. v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 259 (1968) (noting that
the fact that the workers' assistance and management came from the company weighed in
favor of employee status); Silk, 331 U.S. at 719 (concluding that workers who could hire
their own assistants were independent contractors); Hilton Int'l Co. v. N.L.R.B., 690 F.2d
318, 321 (2d Cir. 1982) (arguing that band leaders were independent contractors because
they could hire and fire musicians in their band); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220(2) cmt. 1.
The fact that the hired party may choose to hire and fire assistants, and pays the assist-
ants himself, indicates that the artist is an independent contractor. See Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989) (noting that the artist had full
discretion in hiring and paying assistants); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc.,
903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that a party was an independent contractor,
taking into consideration party's total discretion in hiring and firing assistants); Wishner,
supra note 16, at 411.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(h). If the hiring party usually
employs people to do the kind of work the artist performed, then the artist probably
worked as an employee and not as an independent contractor. See MacLean Assocs., Inc.
v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir. 1991); Wishner,
supra note 16, at 407.
86. See United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 259 (relying on the fact that the employer was in
business and workers did business in company name to find that workers were employees);
Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing the "regular business"
factor as part of the formal employee test); Short, 729 F.2d at 573-76 (finding that the
factor weighed in favor of employee status).
Generally, the fact that the hiring party is in business weighs in his or her favor. See
Wishner, supra note 16, at 409.
87. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105 (citing the factor as part of the "formal employee"
test).
88. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752. After applying each factor to the facts in Reid, the
Court determined that Reid had been an independent contractor and was entitled to the
copyright in the sculpture. See id.
The Supreme Court has frequently stated that, in determining whether a hired party is
an employee, no one factor is dispositive. See Kreiss, supra note 27, at 172. There is no
"shorthand formula or magic phrase" to be applied; instead, all of the circumstances of the
working relationship at issue must be weighed in context. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. at 258.
Other factors, besides those cited in Reid, may also be relevant in the work for hire
context. See Kreiss, supra note 27, at 157-60. For example, the Internal Revenue Code
lists twenty factors for consideration. See REv. RUL. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298-300.
These factors include: whether training of the hired party is required; whether the hired
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The second step under Reid is to apply the appropriate work for hire
subsection of § 101.89 Section 101(1), the scope of employment provision,
defines employee-created works.9° Works created by independent con-
tractors, on the other hand, are defined by § 101(2). 91 A work may be
considered for hire only if it meets the requirements of both steps of the
Reid test. 2
Although the test appears simple enough, as the lower courts have ap-
plied it, the Reid agency test has not resolved the stormy work for hire
controversy.93 Because the Reid Court explicitly noted that none of the
factors relevant to the employment relationship determination are deter-
minative, courts interpreting Reid remain free to apply the factors as they
choose.94 In addition, the Reid decision did not address the scope of em-
ployment issue, and courts have applied the concept inconsistently.95 So
long as application of the work for hire doctrine remains uncertain, copy-
party is required to personally render services; whether the hired party may set the order in
which services are to be provided; whether the hired party has invested in an office or
other facilities; whether the hired party pays business or travel expenses; and, whether the
hired party undertakes financial risk. See id.
89. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 750-51.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1994). If the artist in question was an employee and the
work was produced within the scope of the artist's employment, the work was made for
hire. See id.; see also supra note 6 (quoting the text of the statute).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). A work created by an independent contractor will not be
considered a work for hire unless it is one of the nine kinds enumerated in the statute and
the parties agree in writing that the work will be considered for hire. See id.; see also supra
note 6 (quoting the text of the statute).
92. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738 (1989) (not-
ing that a work may be for hire only if it meets the requirements of either § 101(1) or
§ 101(2)); see also Duran, supra note 32, at 1082 n.9 (discussing the two ways to create a
work for hire).
93. See Goldscheid, supra note 17, at 557 (noting the uncertainty that remains even
after Reid).
94. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 5.03[B], at 5-26 to 5-27 (asserting that by
adopting a test based on numerous factors, the Supreme Court made it possible for future
litigants to challenge their status under general agency principles); Hyde & Hager, supra
note 27, at 708 n. 135 (arguing that Reid "provid[es] a seed bed for lower courts' discretion-
ary preference over which factors control").
In addition, Reid fails to state how each factor would count in the analysis. See Harris,
supra note 4, at 667 (asserting that Reid failed to address the issue of the amount of weight
to be given each of the factors); Weinberg, supra note 18, at 700 (stating that the agency
law test allows courts too much discretion). Thus, Reid may perpetuate the problems of
inconsistency and unpredictability which plagued the prior work for hire tests. See Harris,
supra note 4, at 667.
95. See Kreiss, supra note 27, at 122 (stating that, while Reid adopted common law
agency principles to deal with the employee-independent contractor dichotomy, the term
"scope of employment" has not been interpreted by a comparable decision). Kreiss argues
that courts should also adopt common law agency principles for the scope of employment
determination. See id. However, not all courts have agreed. See Kelstall-Whitney v. Ma-
har, No. CIV.A.89-4684, 1990 WL 69013, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990) (applying the
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right law's "creator-favoring presumption '9 6 will not be fully realized,97
and Reid will remain merely a "fair-weather friend" to creators.
III. THE TURBULENCE CONTINUES IN CASES INTERPRETING RED
The lower courts interpreting Reid have used the Reid factors to reach
different results, often upon similar facts.98 Further, some of the ap-
proaches these courts developed fail to consider properly the competing
interests at stake in work for hire determinations.99 These inconsistencies
undermine copyright law's creation incentives because they perpetuate
unpredictability. 10
Reid factors to determine whether a computer program written by an employee was within
the scope of his employment).
96. See generally Hyde & Hager, supra note 27, at 693. Copyright law historically
presumed that employers owned the copyrights in their employees' work. See id. at 694.
The work for hire doctrine as expressed in § 101, however, presumes that copyright be-
longs to the artist because one should be entitled to the fruits of one's labors. See id. at
693-95.
The work for hire doctrine favors free-lance artists by severely limiting the power of
hiring parties to claim copyright ownership of their works. See Harris, supra note 4, at 686-
87. Although many creators assign their copyright interest to the hiring party, they retain
the right to cancel the assignment after 35 years. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994). If em-
ployers may successfully treat free-lance artists as employees for work for hire purposes,
the ameliorative right to cancel is lost because the hiring party becomes the statutory au-
thor. See Harris, supra note 4, at 686-87. According to Paul Basista:
So here you have an independent contractor Who becomes a de facto employee
for copyright purposes. All the incentives for being in business for yourself ....
for wanting to be a freelancer, are basically cut out from under you. If that can
really determine who is an employee, . . . [then] work-for-hire takes [the right to
capitalize on his own work] away from the creator.
Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18, at 507, 539-40 (statement of Paul Basista); see also
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1491 (11th Cir. 1990) (con-
demning the actual control test because, by allowing an independent contractor to be
treated as an employee, it circumvented the writing requirement of § 101(2)).
97. Cf. Hyde & Hager, supra note 27, at 695 (arguing that Aymes v. Bonelli and Avtec
Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer reflect a trend in judicial decisions favoring creators). See infra
notes 108-26 and 189-204 and accompanying text (discussing Aymes and Avtec).
98. See Luria & Butzel, supra note 27, at S22-24 (discussing the different results
reached on similar facts in three cases).
99. See generally Weinberg, supra note 18, at 702 (arguing that the Reid factors fail to
properly reflect the balancing of employers' and artists' interests achieved by Congress in
§ 101).
100. See Luria & Butzel, supra note 27, at S21 (concluding that the diverse results have
left employers with uncertainty regarding ownership). If employers, who often have access
to counsel, are uncertain about the application of the work for hire doctrine, then artists
are probably unsure as well.
The uncertainty in work for hire cases has important consequences for third parties as
well. See Kreiss, supra note 27, at 124-25. The operation of the work for hire doctrine
affects licenses and assignments of copyright. See id. at 125. If the employer and artist
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The variables in the work for hire doctrine spring from two problems
with Reid.' First, Reid does not direct courts regarding the application
of the agency factors.'0 2 In cases where a hired party's status as em-
ployee or independent contractor is at issue, courts may apply the Reid
factors differently, either excluding or adding factors or assigning greater
or lesser weight to certain factors.'0 3 Second, Reid does not instruct
courts on the definition of "scope of employment," a decisive part of the
§ 101(1) definition, except that it refers courts to the general common law
of agency."° Thus, in cases where a hired party's status as an employee is
undisputed, courts define "scope of employment" in various ways, either
relying on the Reid factors themselves or referring to the common law as
expressed in sections of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.5 Because
misunderstand the nature of their working relationship, licenses or assignments granted by
the party later determined not to be the author may be rendered invalid. See id.
101. In addition to the problems with Reid discussed in this Comment, the Reid test
may be inadequate in other respects. Robert Kreiss argues that courts should review cus-
tom in work for hire determinations, but Reid does not require such evidence. See Kreiss,
supra note 27, at 168-70. In addition, Kreiss argues that some Reid factors involve circular
reasoning and are of questionable validity. See id. at 173 (arguing that the tax and em-
ployee benefit factors are based on circular reasoning). Kreiss also contends that some
factors are useless, and should be discarded. See id. at 175-76 (asserting that whether the
hiring party is in business and whether the hired party is engaged in a distinct occupation is
irrelevant).
Furthermore, Kreiss argues that the common law of agency may not be appropriate in
the copyright context. See id. at 137-39. Agency law developed under tort law and was
designed to apportion respondeat superior liability between employers and their negligent
employees. See id. at 138. The application of agency law in the copyright context means
that copyrights will be awarded to hiring parties if they would be held responsible for
negligence committed by the artist in the course of creating the work. See id. at 139. This
test may seem "completely arbitrary and divorced from any policy rationale derived from
the copyright laws." Id. Kriess concludes, however, that the Reid test in fact is "sensible."
Id.
102. See supra note 26 (demonstrating the elasticity of the Reid factor approach and
how courts have applied the factors in various ways).
103. For example, one court applying Reid determined that the most important factors
in the analysis were whether the hired party received employee benefits and was treated as
an employee for tax purposes. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 863 (2d Cir. 1992).
Another court held that these factors should be accorded only nominal significance. See
Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1118-19 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
104. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (pro-
viding that when the Court has determined that Congress intended terms such as "em-
ployee," "employer," and "scope of employment" to be interpreted according to agency
law, the Court has relied on the general common law of agency); see also infra note 159
(discussing Reid's failure to address the scope of employment issue).
105. For example, one court has relied on the Reid factors to define the scope of em-
ployment. See Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar, No. CIV.A.89-4684, 1990 WL 69013, at *7-8
(E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990). Another court relied on section 228 of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency (1958). See Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (E.D. Va.
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of these variables in the Reid analysis, the application of the work for hire
doctrine remains unpredictable. 10
6
A. Haziness on the Reid Factor Front
Courts have developed at least four different approaches to Reid's
agency factor analysis.'0 7 Generally, these approaches deal with the man-
ner in which the factors are to be weighed, and whether and to what ex-
tent certain factors are to be emphasized in the evaluation. The
interpretations may be characterized as stressing the tax and benefit fac-
tors, overlooking the tax and benefit factors, emphasizing the right to
control, and minimizing the right to control.
1. Stressing the Tax and Benefit Factors
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit demon-
strated the first approach to the Reid factor analysis in Aymes v.
Bonelli. °8 Aymes, which involved computer software written by a free-
lance programmer, required the court to determine whether the program-
mer had worked as an employee or as an independent contractor when
he wrote the software. 10 9 Despite Reid's admonition that none of the
factors should be determinative," 0 the Second Circuit found that two fac-
1992), affd in part and vacated in part, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994), affd, 67 F.3d 293 (4th
Cir. 1995).
106. Reid's use of agency law principles is advantageous, however, in that it increases
consistency among various federal statutes, all of which turn on agency law principles. See
Kreiss, supra note 27, at 123. Attorneys and courts may look for guidance to relevant
agency case law developed under these statutes, which include the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the National Labor Relations Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,
and the Internal Revenue Code. See id.
107. See infra notes 108-56 and accompanying text (discussing the approaches courts
have taken to the Reid analysis).
108. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
109. See id. at 858-59. The defendant, Bonelli, hired Aymes to write a computer pro-
gram for use in Bonelli's retail stores. See id. When the work was completed, Aymes
registered the program with the Copyright Office and sued Bonelli for continuing to use
the program without his permission. See id. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, basing its decision on law developed prior to Reid, con-
cluded that the program was a work for hire, and that Bonelli was its copyright owner. See
Aymes v. Bonelli, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
Because Aymes and Bonelli had not signed a written agreement, § 101(2) was inapplica-
ble and the program could be a work for hire only if Aymes created it as an employee. See
id. at 860.
110. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989).
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tors, tax withholding and employment benefits, are particularly impor-
tant, if not dispositive. 111
Reasoning that the Reid factors were merely "considerations" that
could be "easily misapplied," the court determined that the agency fac-
tors should be weighted according to their factual significance. 12 Under
the Aymes approach, some factors would be virtually irrelevant, while
others would almost always be important and deserved more emphasis in
the analysis." 3
According to the Second Circuit, the particularly important factors in-
cluded the right of the hiring party to direct the creation of the work, the
skill required to create the work, the furnishing of employee benefits to
the artist, the tax treatment of the artist, and whether the hiring party had
the right to assign the artist additional work." 4 These factors were par-
ticularly important because the court found that they were very probative
of the real character of the employment relationship." 5
Of all of the factors, the most important were whether the hiring party
withheld taxes for the artist and whether the hiring party provided em-
ployment benefits to the artist." 6 Hiring parties derive a substantial ben-
efit from classifying artists as independent contractors, because they then
do not have to withhold payroll taxes or pay benefits to the artist. 1 7 The
111. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862. For a discussion of Aymes's weighted factors, see
Hyde & Hager, supra note 27, at 708-13. Hyde and Hager state that the Second Circuit's
discussion suggests that the tax and benefit factors usually will distinguish an employee
from an independent contractor. See id. at 711.
112. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. According to the court, Reid provided that no one factor
was dispositive, but did not guide courts concerning the weighing of the factors. See id.
The fact that none of the factors is dispositive does not necessarily mean that all the factors
should be treated equally, or that all of the factors should be important in every case. See
id.
This concept seems to give the court carte blanche to weigh the factors, because it is
unclear when a factor would be considered important in a case. Is a factor to be consid-
ered important because its application yields an equitable result? If so, then the factors
become merely a means to rationalizing a predetermined end. Or, is a factor important if
it happens to be present in a particular fact situation, and other factors are not? If so, then
the analysis ignores the balancing of interests which Reid announced.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 863. It is interesting to speculate about how California's work made for
hire law might affect Aymes's reasoning in this regard. California includes commissioned
artists in its definition of "employee" for workers' compensation and insurance purposes,
thereby entitling commissioned artists to worker's compensation and unemployment bene-
fits. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351.5(c) (West 1995); Gregory T. Victoroff, California's Work
Made For Hire Laws, in THE VISUAL ARTIST'S BUSINESS AND LEGAL GUIDE 141 (Gregory
T. Victoroff, ed., 1995). Thus, the employment benefit factors, at least, probably lose much
of their relevance in California.
117. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862.
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court reasoned that it would be inequitable for an employer to thereby
profit, but then to be able to treat the artist as an employee for work for
hire purposes. 1 8 The court also found that most cases decided under
Reid held in favor of the artist if employment benefits were not provided
or taxes not withheld.119
Although the court stated that several factors were insignificant, it pro-
vided only two examples. 2 ° First, the right to hire assistants would be
unimportant in cases where the nature of the work required the creator
to work alone.' 2' The court, however, found the right to hire assistants
would be important if the hired party actually employed assistants with-
out the consent of the hiring party. 122 The court reasoned that this factor
then would be "highly indicative" that the artist was not an employee. 123
Second, the court found that whether the work was part of the hiring
party's regular business would be irrelevant in most cases, as most busi-
nesses employ support staff.
124
The agency factors applied in Aymes were somewhat balanced: two fac-
tors indicated that Aymes worked as an employee, three indicated that he
worked as an independent contractor, and the rest were inconclusive. 25
The court's emphasis on the employer's failure to withhold taxes and pro-
vide benefits, however, allowed it to find that Aymes worked as an in-
dependent contractor and that the program was not for hire.'2 6
118. See id. The court held that because Bonelli deliberately denied Aymes these basic
characteristics of employment, he was effectively estopped from arguing that Aymes had
been an employee. See id at 862-63.
In addition, requiring that an employer treat hired parties consistently for copyright, tax,
and other purposes promotes uniformity across a variety of federal statutes. See Kreiss,
supra note 27, at 123. If an employer treats a hired party as an employee under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, he or she also should classify the hired party as an employee under the
Copyright Act of 1976. See id.
119. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 864.
122. See id
123. See id.
124. See id at 863.
125. See id at 862-64.
126. See id. at 864. The court found that Bonelli clearly had the right to direct Aymes'
work, because he gave Aymes specific instructions regarding what the program was to be
created to do. See idt at 862. This factor, then, counted "heavily" in favor of Aymes being
an employee. See id. Bonelli also had the right to assign additional work to Aymes. See
id at 863. Although this factor weighed "strongly" in favor of an employee relationship,
the court held that some independent contractors worked under the same conditions. See
idt Therefore, the factor did not conclusively favor Bonelli. See id
However, the court found that Aymes, as a computer programmer, possessed a high
level of skill. See id. at 862. Aymes had not received any employee benefits, such as
health, unemployment or life insurance benefits, and Bonelli did not pay any percentage of
1996]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 46:119
2. Overlooking the Tax and Benefit Factors
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois virtually ignored the employee benefits and tax factors that
were so critical in Aymes. 127 In Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status
of Women,' 28 the works at issue were teaching materials developed by
the plaintiff, Mast.' 29 The defendant, Committee, purchased the materi-
als and began reproducing them without Mast's permission. 130  When
Mast sued for infringement, Committee claimed that Mast had worked as
an employee and that the materials were works for hire.' 31
The court agreed with the Aymes decision insofar as it concluded that
the Reid factors should be weighted according to their factual signifi-
cance.' 32 Thus, even if several factors counted in favor of employee sta-
tus, a hired party could be an independent contractor if other factors
weighed more heavily in the analysis.' 33
Aymes's social security or income taxes. See id. These factors indicated that Aymes was
an independent contractor. See id.
The remaining Reid factors were inconclusive. Aymes had been paid both hourly wages
and lump sums at various times, so the method of payment was not particularly indicative
of his employment status. See id. at 863. Further, whether the work was part of Bonelli's
regular business was of "little use" in evaluating Aymes's claim. Id. Also, whether Bonelli
was in business had little if anything to do with Aymes's employment status, so that factor
deserved little weight. See iL Aymes and Bonelli both had some control over when and
how long Aymes was to work, and, although Aymes worked for Bonelli for a fairly long
period of time, during that period he also accepted projects from other employers. See id.
at 863-64. Since Aymes did not use assistants, the authority to hire assistants factor was
"virtually meaningless." See id. at 864. Finally, the location of the work and the source of
the equipment were unimportant because Aymes had worked at Bonelli's offices, using
Bonelli's computer, in order to install the program. See id.
127. See Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1119
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (characterizing a hiring party's withholding of taxes as a "feather in the
scales" of the Reid analysis).
128. 815 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
129. See id. at 1115.
130. See id. at 1115-16. The United States Department of Health and Human Services
awarded the defendant, Committee, a grant to allow it to administer a program in public
schools teaching sexual abstinence. See id. at 1115. After Committee purchased the plain-
tiffs manuscripts for use in the educational program, it reproduced and distributed the
materials without the plaintiff's permission, pursuant to authority purportedly granted by
the Department of Health and Human Services. See id. at 1115-16.
131. See id. at 1116.
132. See id. at 1117-18 (citing Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992)).
133. See Respect, 815 F. Supp. at 1118. The court cited Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992), and
Marco v. Accent Pub. Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992), all cases in which hired parties
were found to be independent contractors even though more Reid factors suggested em-
ployee status. See Respect, 815 F. Supp. at 1118.
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Unlike Aymes, though, Respect held that the tax and benefit factors
were practically inconsequential. 134 The court stated that Reid requires
examination of all of the agency factors, unlike Aymes, in which some
factors were considered irrelevant.1 35 Based upon its weighted analysis,
the court concluded that the teaching materials were not works for hire,
and that Mast was the statutory author.136
3. Emphasizing the Right to Control
In MacLean Associates, Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen,
Inc. , the Third Circuit took a different approach to the Reid factors. In
that case, MacLean, a former employee of Mercer, provided some con-
sulting services to one of Mercer's clients and developed a computer pro-
134. See Respect, 815 F. Supp. at 1118-19. Regarding the employment benefits factor,
the court stated that Mast did not receive employee benefits in the customary use of the
term. See id. at 1118. Based on the court's brief treatment of the subject, it is unclear
whether she might have received employee benefits in another sense of the term. Still,
Respect gave fairly cursory treatment to a factor considered highly significant in Aymes.
See id.
Regarding the tax withholding factor, the court in Respect acknowledged that Commis-
sion in fact withheld payroll taxes for Mast. See id. According to the court, other parties
who hired Mast often withheld taxes from her paychecks, and thus the fact that Commis-
sion also withheld taxes for Mast was irrelevant. See id.
135. See id. ("It should be remembered that [Reid] mandates consideration of all the
factors."). In reaching this conclusion, the Respect court cited Reid. However, a careful
review of the cited pages in Reid does not reveal such language, and furthermore, the
Supreme Court stated in Reid that "[n]o one of [the] factors is determinative." Reid, 490
U.S. at 752. The Second Circuit in Aymes cited the same passage for its conclusion that not
all of the factors would have to be considered in any given case. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at
861. The Respect court itself cited Aymes for the proposition that not all factors would be
relevant in every case. See Respect, 815 F. Supp. at 1117-18. Therefore, the court's asser-
tion that all of the Reid factors must be considered seems, at least, inconsistent.
136. Although Committee exercised some control over the content of the teaching
materials, Mast really had created the "content and flavor" of the books. Respect, 815 F.
Supp. at 1118. Furthermore, Mast worked mostly in her own office, using her own equip-
ment, and was free to determine when and how long to work. See id. Although the parties
disagreed about who owned the tools used to create the materials and who had hired as-
sistants, the court determined that those issues were insignificant because Mast worked
from her own research, used her own supplies, and was in charge of designing the materi-
als. See id. Committee was not a regular textbook publisher, and during the period that
Mast worked with Committee, she published works in conjunction with other companies.
See id. The court noted that, even though Committee withheld payroll taxes from Mast's
checks, such arrangements were not uncommon in independent contracting relationships.
See id. Finally, the court held that Mast did not receive employee benefits as the term is
generally understood. See id. The court concluded that Mast was an independent contrac-
tor and that the manuscript therefore was not a work for hire under § 101(1). See id. at
1119. Nor was it a work for hire under § 101(2) because Mast and Committee never signed
a written agreement. See id.
137. 952 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1991).
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gram for the client's use. 138 MacLean and Mercer disagreed as to which
of them owned the copyright in the program. 139 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that the
program was a work for hire and awarded copyright ownership to Mer-
cer.140 The Third Circuit vacated the district court's decision.
14 1
Like Aymes and Respect, MacLean began with an analysis of the Reid
factors. 42 The court in MacLean, however, characterized the right to
control factor as the "central" issue in establishing whether an artist is an
employee or independent contractor.' 43 The remaining factors, according
to the court, were merely "pertinent" to the inquiry.'" Strangely, the
court addressed each of the Reid factors, without commenting specifically
upon the issue of Mercer's right to control the creation of the program. 45
138. See id. at 773. The client was not informed that MacLean was no longer Mercer's
employee. See id.
139. See id at 773-74. MacLean brought suit for copyright infringement. See id. at 771.
At the close of his case, the district court directed a verdict against MacLean, holding that
because MacLean had been Mercer's employee when he wrote the program, Mercer was
entitled to copyright ownership. See id. at 772.
Interestingly, in finding that MacLean had been Mercer's employee when he wrote the
program, the district court relied on the fact that MacLean had been Mercer's apparent
agent at the time. See id. at 777-78. Apparent agency is a doctrine of the common law of
agency which holds that, if a person holds himself out as an agent of another, even if he is
not, and a third party reasonably relies on that representation, the person will be consid-
ered an agent in fact. See HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP 57-64 (1979). The district court was convinced that, because Mercer's
client believed that MacLean was still Mercer's employee when he provided consulting
services, he should be treated as an apparent agent. See MacLean, 952 F.2d at 777-78.
140. See MacLean, 952 F.2d at 772.
141. See id. at 781.
142. See id. at 776.
143. Id. (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751
(1989)). Robert Kreiss has adopted this interpretation of Reid as well. See Kreiss, supra
note 27, at 157. Kreiss argues that Reid should be interpreted as follows:
In order to determine whether a hired party is an employee under the common-
law agency doctrine, the relationship between the parties must be examined to
determine whether the hiring party has the right to control the manner and means
by which the product is accomplished. This involves looking at many factors.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
144. MacLean, 952 F.2d at 776. The court seemed to consider the remainder of the
Reid factors subordinate to what it determined was the primary issue, the question of the
hiring party's right to control the project. See id.
145. See id. at 776-78. The court considered that writing the software required skill and
creativity, and MacLean had written it on his own computer, using his own software. See
id. at 777.
In addition, MacLean's contract with Mercer had a relatively short duration, and Mercer
did not have the right to assign other projects to MacLean. See id. MacLean had absolute
freedom to choose when and how long to work, and he was paid on a project by project
basis, not by salary. See id. Finally, Mercer was not in the regular business of providing
software to its clients, and did not pay payroll or social security taxes, workers' compensa-
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Based on its analysis of the factors, the court remanded the case for a trial
on MacLean's claims of copyright infringement against Mercer. 146
4. Minimizing the Right to Control
In Marco v. Accent Publishing Co. ,147 the Third Circuit retreated from
MacLean's emphasis on the control factor. The plaintiff, Marco, was
hired to shoot photographs for Accent Publishing's magazine, and sued
when Accent threatened to publish some of the photographs without his
permission.' 48 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania found that Marco was an employee when he shot the
photos, and denied his request for a preliminary injunction against the
publication.' 49
The Third Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded
the case.' 50 The lower court had relied on only some of the Reid factors,
but all of the factors, according to the circuit court, should have been
considered. 5' The court performed its own analysis, and concluded that
Marco, as an independent contractor, was entitled to the copyright in his
photographs. 52
tion coverage, or unemployment insurance for MacLean. See id. On this basis, the court
held that a rational jury could have found that MacLean was an independent contractor at
the time he wrote the program, and that the district court had erred by directing a verdict
against MacLean on his infringement claim. See id. at 778.
The court then held that the doctrine of apparent agency, although relevant to the com-
mon law agency doctrine, was not applicable in the work for hire context. See id. This is
justified because the agency principles used in the work for hire doctrine apply to relation-
ships between the hired and hiring parties, not with third parties. Thus, the fact that Mer-
cer's client was not aware that MacLean was no longer employed by the company was
irrelevant. See id
146. See id. at 781. Based on its analysis of the Reid factors, the court held that a
rational jury could have found that MacLean was an independent contractor at the time he
created the program. See idt at 778. Therefore, the district court had erred by directing a
verdict for Mercer on its infringement claim. See id.
147. 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992).
148. See id. at 1548-49. Accent and Marco never signed a written contract or discussed
copyright or licensing. See id. at 1548.
149. Marco v. Accent Publ'g Co., Inc., No. CIV.A.91-2057, 1991 WL 212187, at *7, *11
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1991).
150. See Marco, 969 F.2d at 1553.
151. See id. at 1550-52.
152. See id at 1550. The court held that the factors weighed in favor of Marco being an
independent contractor. See id First, Marco used his own photographic equipment and
paid his own taxes. See id. In addition, he worked out of his own studio, was not given any
employment benefits, and worked in a skilled occupation. See id Marco could choose
when and how long to work; the fact that Accent had imposed a deadline for the comple-
tion of his work did not weigh against his status as an independent contractor. See id.
Furthermore, Accent did not have the right to assign additional work to Marco, and the six
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While the Marco court emphasized the hiring party's control over the
details of the work, it did not do so in the same manner as the court in
Respect.'53 After finding that Accent exercised direction and control
over the creation of the photos, the court stated that the issue of control
should be kept "in perspective."' 5 4 According to the court, because the
control factor is reminiscent of the actual control and right to control
tests that Reid rejected, it should not be relied upon too heavily.' 55
Therefore, even though Accent exercised a good deal of control over the
photographs at issue, the court accorded that fact little weight.156
The Aymes, Respect, MacLean, and Marco cases demonstrate the vari-
ous ways that courts have manipulated the application of the Reid factors.
In addition, courts can reach different results based upon the application
of the second prong of § 101(1)'s work for hire test: the requirement that
the work be created within the scope of the artist's employment.
B. Fog Blankets the "Scope of Employment" Analysis
Under Reid, once a court determines that a work was created by an
employee under the common law rules of agency, it must next consider
whether the work was produced within the scope of the artist's employ-
ment.157 Therefore, how a court defines "scope of employment" greatly
impacts determinations of copyright ownership. 15  Unfortunately, Reid
month duration of their relationship did not weigh in favor of Marco being an employee
since he worked irregular hours. See id. at 1551.
Only three factors weighed in Accent's favor. First, Accent was in regular business, so it
more likely would employ people. See id. Second, Accent was in the regular business of
trade photography. See id. Finally, Accent exercised control over the details of the work.
See id. The court found that the last three Reid factors---custom in the industry, the par-
ties' intentions regarding Marco's status, and control and compensation of assistants-did
not apply. See id. at 1552.
The court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the preliminary
injunction in light of factors unrelated to the work for hire determination. See id. at 1553.
153. See id. at 1550-51.
154. Id. at 1551 (noting that the control factor is not dispositive).
155. See id. (stating that courts should apply this factor with caution because it resem-
bles the control test rejected in Reid).
156. See id. at 1552. Accent provided jewelry and props at the photo sessions, and
sketched the intended layout of the photos. See id. at 1551. Accent also sometimes pro-
vided an Art Director who was responsible for the "subject matter, composition, and
mood" of the photos. Id. at 1552 (internal quotations omitted).
157. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51 (1989)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1988)). Even employee-created works are not considered made
for hire if they are prepared outside of the scope of employment. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1).
158. See infra note 159 (discussing Reid's treatment of the scope of employment
determination).
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does not guide courts toward a definition of scope of employment 159 and,
as a result, at least three courts have addressed the issue differently.
1. Misplaced Reliance on the Reid Factors
In Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar,'6° the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania took a novel approach to the scope of employment
inquiry by relying on the Reid factors themselves.' 61 The work at issue
was a computer program defendant Mahar created to improve software
that his employer, Kelstall-Whitney, marketed. 62 When Mahar pro-
posed that Kelstall-Whitney promote the improved program and that
they share the profits, Kelstall-Whitney terminated Mahar's employment
and sued, claiming that the program was a work for hire. 63
There was in fact no question that Mahar was Kelstall-Whitney's em-
ployee when he wrote the program. 64 Therefore, the only real issue
before the court was whether the program was written within the scope of
Mahar's employment. 165 In making its decision, the court relied on the
159. Reid did not reach the issue of scope of employment because it found that the
artist worked as an independent contractor, not as an employee. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-
53. Presumably, Reid directs courts to the common law of agency, but the command is by
no means clear. See id. at 750-51. The Court stated that to determine whether a work is
for hire, a court should consult common law agency principles to discern whether an em-
ployee or independent contractor created the work. See id. at 751. Thereafter, the court
can apply the relevant subsection of § 101. See id. Even if Reid adopted agency principles
to guide the scope of employment definition, it did not choose a particular test as it did for
the definition of employee. See id. at 751-52 (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2)).
160. No. CIV.A.89-4684, 1990 WL 69013 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990).
161. See id. at *7-9.
162. See id. at *2.
163. See id. at *6. Mahar and Kelstall-Whitney filed competing applications for copy-
right of various versions of Mahar's program. See id. Kelstall-Whitney brought suit to
require that one of Mahar's copyright registrations be transferred to her name, claiming
that she was entitled to the copyright by virtue of the work for hire doctrine. See id.
164. See id. at *1 (recognizing that Kelstall-Whitney hired Mahar as a full-time em-
ployee to be paid an hourly rate). The court also stated:
Robert C. Mahar . . . was employed as a formal employee of Carolyn Kelsall-
Whitney [sic] .... During his formal employment for [Kelstall-Whitney], he re-
ceived the standard income tax and social security withholding treatment of [Kel-
stall-Whitney's] employees and the standard benefits of [Kelstall-Whitney's]
employees, including but not limited to unemployment compensation insurance,
workman's compensation insurance and other benefits.
Id. at *6.
Despite this, the court claimed to apply the Reid factors in order to determine whether
Mahar worked as an employee or as an independent contractor. See id. at *7-8. Given
that Mahar was clearly Kelstall-Whitney's employee, however, and that the factors consid-
ered by the court make better sense in the scope of employment context, the court most
likely was determining the scope of Mahar's employment.
165. See supra note 6 (describing the elements of § 101(1)).
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Reid factors, and in so doing established the Reid agency factors as one
scope of employment test.166
The Kelstall-Whitney court's reliance on the Reid factors probably was
misplaced. Although Reid did not expressly limit the use of the factors to
the determination of employment status, the Restatement (Second) of
Agency section 220, upon which the court relied, is so limited.'67 Section
220, entitled "Definition of Servant," and its factors cited in Reid, are
designed to make the distinction between employees and independent
contractors. 168 Other sections of the Restatement (Second) of Agency de-
fine the scope of employment and provide other factors for
consideration.169
166. See Kelstall-Whitney, 1990 WL 69013 at *1 ("Plaintiff hired defendant as an em-
ployee ... [who] was to be paid an hourly wage and to work approximately 40 hours per
week, with no overtime."); see also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) ("In determining... whether a hired party is an employee under
the general common law of agency, we consider [these factors] .... ).
Because the Supreme Court has not defined "scope of employment" specifically, lower
courts are free to define it as they wish, within the confines of the general law of agency.
However, because section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency deals directly with
the subject, it is a more appropriate definition. Kelstall-Whitney's reliance on the Reid
factors is, therefore, probably misplaced.
Several of the factors cited in Kelstall-Whitney support the inference that the court was
actually making a scope of employment determination. For example, the court's reliance
on Mahar's low wage supports the inference that he was being paid only for the work he
performed by the hour for Kelstall-Whitney and that his programming work therefore was
outside the scope of his employment. See Kelstall-Whitney, 1990 WL 69013 at *8. In addi-
tion, the court's reliance on the fact that the program was created for use by one of Kel-
stall-Whitney's customers supports the argument that it may have been written within the
scope of Mahar's employment. See id. at *8.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
168. See id.
169. Several sections of the Restatement (Second) of Agency apply to scope of employ-
ment determinations. The scope of employment is generally delimited in section 228,
which provides:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) (omitted).
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in
kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too
little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
The omitted portion of section 228 deals with intentional torts committed by employees
and is not relevant in work for hire ownership determinations. See Miller v. CP Chems.,
Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 n.5 (D.S.C. 1992).
Additional sections of the Restatement further refine the scope of employment concept.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 ("Kind of Conduct Within Scope of
Employment"); id. § 230 ("Forbidden Acts"); id. § 231 ("Criminal or Tortious Acts"); id.
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Assuming that Kelstall-Whitney's use of the Reid factors was proper, its
application of the factors was selective. The court did not refer to all of
the Reid factors17° and applied some factors not discussed in Reid. 7'
Based upon this unusual analysis, the court in Kelstall-Whitney concluded
that the program was not a work for hire and awarded the copyright to
Mahar. 17
2
§ 232 ("Failure to Act"); id. § 233 ("Time of Service"); id. § 234 ("Area of Service"); id.
§ 235 ("Conduct Not for Purpose of Serving Master"); id. § 236 ("Conduct Actuated by
Dual Purpose"); id. § 237 ("Re-entry into Employment") (1958).
170. See Kelstall-Whitney, 1990 WL 69013, at *7-9. The court did not discuss several of
the Reid factors, including the hiring party's right to control; the skill required; the dura-
tion of the relationship between the parties; the right of the hiring party to assign other
work to the hired party; the freedom of the hired party in deciding when or how long to
work; the hired party's responsibility for hiring and compensating assistants; the extension
of employment benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. See id.
The court did note, in discussing Mahar's salary, that his "final" wages were only $ 7.50
per hour. Id. at *8. The fact that the court used the word "final" may suggest that payroll
taxes were withheld from Mahar's checks, but the court does not discuss the issue further.
Id.
171. See id. at *10 (discussing Mahar's maintenance of his time sheets). Of course,
creating new factors is permissible under Reid, as the Court referred to its list of factors as
"nonexhaustive." Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
The court in Kelstall-Whitney considered very significant the fact that Kelstall-Whitney
could not satisfactorily explain how she obtained certain copies of the program, and that it
appeared she had in fact stolen them from Mahar. See Kelstall-Whitney, 1990 WL 69013, at
*9-10.
Other non-Reid factors relied upon by the court seem pertinent to scope of employment
analysis. Although Mahar worked on Kelstall-Whitney's computer equipment, the court
considered it important that he did so after hours and with Kelstall-Whitney's express per-
mission. See id. at *8. The court determined outright that the program had not been writ-
ten within the scope of Mahar's employment. See id. In addition, the court apparently was
impressed by the fact that Mahar received a relatively low wage. See id.
Finally, the court asserted that Mahar "authored" the program. Id. Actually, the au-
thorship determination should have been a legal conclusion made based on the factor anal-
ysis, not a part of the analysis itself. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (providing that "[iun the
case of a work made for hire, the employer ... is considered the author"). Whether the
court meant these factors to be evidence of the existence of the Reid factors which it did
not address, or whether the court really was creating new factors, is unclear.
172. See Kelstall-Whitney, 1990 WL 69013, at *7-9. Several Reid factors weighed in
favor of the program being a work for hire. Mahar was a full-time employee of Kelstall-
Whitney, and Kelstall-Whitney was in the regular business of creating and marketing com-
puter programs. See id. at *8. The program was written for use by one of Kelstall-
Whitney's customers, although it is unclear whether the court considered this a separate
factor or whether it simply evidenced that Kelstall-Whitney was in the regular business of
computer programming. See id.
Other factors weighed against the program being for hire. Mahar wrote the program
during his personal time, and did not receive any wages for the time he spent working on it.
See id. The program was not written, according to the court, "in the course and scope of
[Mahar's] employment." Id. Additionally, Kelstall-Whitney was opposed to Mahar's
working on the program and refused to support it. See id.
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2. Reliance on Section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
In Miller v. CP Chemicals, Inc. ," the United States District Court for
South Carolina relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency to make a
work for hire scope of employment determination. 17 4 CP Chemicals
(CP) employed the plaintiff, Miller, as a laboratory supervisor.'75 Miller
developed a computer program to accelerate the mathematical calcula-
tions involved in chemical manufacturing in CP's labs.' 76 Miller clearly
was an employee of CP when he wrote the program. 17 7 The only ques-
tion was whether the program was created within the scope of his
employment.
17
The court held that although Reid did not specifically address the law
governing scope of employment determinations, because it adopted com-
mon law agency principles to define "employee," common law agency
principles should be equally relevant to define "scope of employment.'
179
The court in Miller adopted as its test the elements set forth in section
228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.' 80
The Miller court applied each element of the test in section 228.81
Although it found that the first two agency factors in section 228 did not
establish conclusively that Miller created the program within the course
of his employment, 82 relying on section 229 of the Restatement, the court
173. 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992).
174. See id. at 1243-44.
175. See id. at 1240.
176. See id. Like Mahar in Kelstall-Whitney, Miller wrote the program on his own time,
using his own computer equipment, and was not paid for the time he spent working on the
program. See id. Also, Miller posted a notice on the computer terminal at work, stating
that the copyright in the program belonged to him. See id. at 1241.
177. See id. at 1242.
178. See id. at 1242-43.
179. See id. at 1243 (citing Commission [sic] for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 741 (1989)).
The Miller court further noted, though, that the provisions of the Restatement might not
be entirely appropriate to work for hire situations. It stated that: "The Restatement provi-
sions relate directly to the question of respondeat superior liability of the employer for the
tortious acts of the servant. Thus, the Restatement's discussion of the scope of employ-
ment is not directly on point with the issues in this case. However, the Restatement's
discussion is generally applicable." Id. at 1243 n.4.
180. See id. at 1243.
181. See id. at 1243-44. Miller was not hired to write computer programs, but as a
laboratory supervisor he was responsible for overseeing the efficiency of the lab's opera-
tions. See id. at 1243. Although Miller did most of his programming work at home for no
pay, the programming was completed nevertheless while Miller was employed by CP. See
id. The court concluded that Miller created the program at least partially because he
wanted to please his employer. See id. at 1243-44.
182. See id. at 1243. Miller was not hired "primarily" to develop computer programs,
although the court noted that writing the program was "incidental" to Miller's organiza-
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found that the creation of the program was incidental to Miller's job."3
Because Miller was responsible for organizing and modernizing the labo-
ratory that he supervised, the creation of the computer program was con-
tional responsibilities. Id. Miller worked on the program in his home without pay; how-
ever, he was employed by CP during the general time period in which he worked on the
program. See id. Because the first two factors did not clearly favor either Miller or CP, the
court relied heavily on the third element of section 228 as well as section 229 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency (1958). See id.
183. See Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243. Section 229 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency provides:
(1) To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same gen-
eral nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.
(2) 1I determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is never-
theless so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the
scope of employment, the following matters of fact are to be considered:
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants;
(b) the time, place and purpose of the act;
(c) the previous relations between the master and servant;
(d) the extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between dif-
ferent servants;
(e) whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within
the enterprise, has not been entrusted to any servant;
(f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be
done;
(g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized;
(h) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been
furnished by the master to the servant;
(i) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an au-
thorized result; and
(j) whether or not the act is seriously criminal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (1958).
The court actually did not cite directly to section 229, but to comment b of section 229.
Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243. The comment provides in pertinent part:
An act may be incidental to an authorized act, although considered separately it is
an entirely different kind of act. To be incidental, however, it must be one which
is subordinate to or pertinent to an act which the servant is employed to perform.
It must be within the ultimate objective of the principal and an act which it is not
unlikely that such a servant might do. The fact that a particular employer has no
reason to expect the particular servant to perform the act is not conclusive.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. b (1958).
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sidered incidental to his job duties.'8 The program apparently had been
written to please Miller's employer.' 5
Based on this analysis, the court concluded that the program had been
prepared within the scope of Miller's employment and was a work for
hire. 86 The Miller court recognized that, usually, work that an employee
performs outside the work place, without pay, would not be considered
for hire.' 87 However, where the work was created with a specific product
of the employer in mind and for the good of the employer, the court
placed it squarely within the scope of the worker's employment.1
88
184. See Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243. The computer program was considered within
CP's "ultimate objectives" because it improved the organization of the lab and was not an
activity that Miller was unlikely to undertake personally. Id. This conclusion of the court
appears questionable, as it hardly seems reasonable to expect a laboratory employee, re-
sponsible for overseeing chemical manufacturing operations, to write computer software.
Furthermore, in this context it should be remembered that the Restatement's formulation is
intended to protect employers from their employee's unexpected torts, not govern complex
copyright determinations. See Goldscheid, supra note 17, at 573 (asserting that, because
agency principles are founded upon liability issues, they may not be appropriate for use in
work for hire property ownership determinations). Therefore, the fact that it may not have
been unlikely that Miller would write a computer program may not properly resolve the
issue.
185. See Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243-44.
186. See id. at 1244.
187. See id. at 1244 n.7.
188. See id. A rule of this kind could have drastic consequences for employees who,
inspired by the needs of their employers, work at home, without pay, to develop copyright-
able works. See Luria & Butzel, supra note 27, at S21 (arguing that relying on case law
without reducing an employment agreement to writing is risky for employers whose em-
ployees perform creative work outside of the workplace, as well as for companies who use
freelance consultants). Many employees who work independently at home are motivated
in some way by their employment, if only because they have witnessed certain problems at
work and are interested in developing solutions to them. See supra notes 160-72 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Kelstall-Whitney case). Many such employees probably
consider presenting their work to their employers hoping to be rewarded. Under this test,
even if they decide not to do so, their works might be considered for hire. The test the
court announced in Miller makes no reference to whether such works need to have been
used at the work place at all, or whether the employer even need be aware of their exist-
ence. For an employee to lose ownership of a work, prepared at home, in his personal
time, for which he was not paid, would be a highly inequitable result. Since the work for
hire doctrine is based on the notion that employed artists forego copyright protection in
exchange for security, wages, and other benefits, awarding copyright ownership to an em-
ployer in a case like Miller gives the employer a windfall and deprives the artist of the
benefits of his or her work. See supra notes 19 and 32 (discussing the distinction between
employed artists and independent creators for copyright ownership purposes); see also
Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18, at 531 (statement of Paul Basista) (commenting on
the inequity that results when free-lance artists are forced to forego copyright ownership in
work for hire situations when they do not receive employment benefits in exchange).
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3. Requiring Stricter Compliance with Section 228 of the Restatement
One court has required even stricter compliance with section 228 of the
Restatement than the Miller court. In Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer,'89 the
court held that the relevant test for defining "scope of employment" was
section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.' 90 Peiffer, the de-
fendant, was a computer programmer employed by Avtec. 19' Peiffer and
Avtec disagreed about which of them owned the copyright in a program
Peiffer developed, and Avtec brought suit."9
Because it was undisputed that Peiffer was an employee of Avtec, the
question for the court was whether the work was within the scope of Peif-
fer's employment.' 93 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia agreed with the court in Miller that section 228 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency was dispositive. 194 The court held that
the evidence Avtec produced failed to show that the work was within the
scope of Peiffer's employment.
195
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's use of section 228, but
disagreed with the district court's interpretation. 96 The court found that
the program was the kind of work that Peiffer had been hired to per-
form.'19 7 The court stated that generally, where the work in question is of
the kind that the employee was hired to perform, the fact that the work
was done in the employee's home during his or her spare time will not
defeat the presumption that the work was for hire.' 98 More important,
however, was whether the artist was "appreciably" motivated to conduct
the work because of the employer's objectives. 99 The Fourth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the computer
program had been created within the scope of Peiffer's employment.2 °°
On remand, the district court found that the employer must prove each
element of section 228 to establish that a work was within the scope of
189. 805 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd in part and vacated in part, 21 F.3d 568
(4th Cir. 1994), affd, 67 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1995).
190. See id. at 1318 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
191. See id at 1314.
192. See id. at 1315.
193. See id. at 1318.
194. See id.; see also supra note 169 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 228).
195. See Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. at 1318-19.
196. See Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994), affd, 67 F.3d 293
(4th Cir. 1995).
197. See idt
198. See id.
199. See id. at 572 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 cmt. b
(1958)).
200. See id. at 573-74.
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employment.2°' The court found that the program had not been created
"substantially within the authorized time and space limits" because it had
not been authored on Avtec's premises and Avtec did not use or possess
the program on its premises on a regular basis.20 2 Finally, the court held
that Avtec failed to prove that Peiffer was "appreciably" motivated by a
desire to further Avtec's business purposes. 20 3 Because Avtec had failed
to prove two of the elements of the test, the district court again found
that the program was not a work for hire and that Peiffer was entitled to
its copyright.2°
The Mahar, Miller, and Avtec cases demonstrate the different ap-
proaches courts have taken in applying Reid. Because Reid does not pro-
vide clear guidance on how to implement its agency test, courts have
great discretion in fashioning their decisions.2 5 The work for hire doc-
trine, as applied under Reid, thus remains uncertain.20 6
IV. ANALYSIS: REID'S VARIABLE SKIES
The work for hire doctrine strikes a careful balance between the inter-
ests of employers and employed artists. 2 7 Work for hire law recognizes
201. Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, No. CIV.A.92-463-A, 1994 WL 791188, at *2-5 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 12, 1994).
202. Id. at *4. The court also stated that it reached its conclusion despite decisions by
other courts which found works to have been for hire when they were created at home, on
the employee's own time. See id. at *5 (citing Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238,
1242-44 (D.S.C. 1992) (concluding that a work created by an employee at home, in his
spare time, using his own equipment, was a work for hire); In re Simplified Info. Sys., Inc.,
89 B.R. 538, 542 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (same); Marshall v. Miles Lab., Inc., 647 F. Supp.
1326, 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (same)).
203. See Avtec Sys., 1994 WL 791188 at *6-7. The fact that Avtec paid a substantial cash
bonus to Peiffer upon completion of the first version of the program was regarded by the
court as a neutral factor, as it was impossible to determine whether the bonus was meant to
reward Peiffer for his good work or to reward him for his willingness to donate the use of
the program to his employer. See id. at *6. Although the court did not address this issue, if
the bonus had been meant to reward Peiffer for his good work, it would be reasonable to
infer that Peiffer had been motivated by the desire to please his employer. This conclusion
is less likely if Peiffer decided, after creation of the program, to turn it over to his employer
and was then rewarded.
Peiffer's use of the program to market Avtec's satellite capabilities to potential Avtec
customers tends to show that Peiffer was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to impress
his employer. See id. at *7. Because Peiffer later refused to demonstrate the program to
potential customers, however, the court held that the factor was ambiguous at best. See id.
204. See id.
205. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 700 (asserting that because the agency law test is
very flexible, courts are allowed too much discretion).
206. See id.
207. See generally Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18 (discussing, through represent-
atives of industries and artists, the interests of creative people and employers, and the
impact and practical operation of work for hire law).
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that artist-employees who are paid for their work receive employment
benefits; when they have exercised little control over the production of
their work, they are adequately compensated and do not require the eco-
nomic protection copyright ownership affords. The employers of such
artists, however, require copyright ownership as compensation for the as-
sumption of commercial risk.20 Section 101 was drafted, in part, as a
compromise between artists and employers, to ensure that each would
receive copyright protection only when truly entitled to it.2°9 When it is
not applied uniformly, however, work for hire generally results in wind-
falls to employers and, occasionally, artists. 210 Furthermore, uncertainty
in work for hire law undermines the twin purposes of copy-
right: stimulating creativity and fairly compensating artists.21' Thus, the
Reid factors should be applied uniformly and in a way that maintains the
careful balance between the rights of employers and artists.
Moreover, the operation of work for hire law has particularly drastic
consequences for artists because of their inferior bargaining power with
hiring parties.21 2 Despite copyright law's goal of ensuring fair compensa-
tion for creators,21 3 artists often are forced to submit to work for hire
agreements.21 4 Therefore, the courts should administer the work for hire
doctrine carefully, with particular concern for the rights of artists.21 5
208. See supra note 32 (discussing the rationale for granting copyright to employers in
work for hire cases).
209. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 670-84 (discussing the compromise of interests
underlying the work for hire doctrine).
210. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750 (1989) (re-
jecting the actual control test because it forced parties to guess in advance whether suffi-
cient control would be exercised and provided unbargained for copyright interests); see
also supra notes 108-204 and accompanying text (discussing cases which have resulted in
windfalls to employers or artists).
211. See supra note 2 (discussing the purposes of copyright law).
212. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1308-09 (noting that because of unequal bargaining
power, artists often are forced to choose between accepting a work for hire agreement or
not submitting the work at all).
213. See supra note 2 (discussing the purposes of copyright law).
214. See supra note 2; see also Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18, at 515 (statement
of Richard Weisgrau) ("It is usually after you invoice the work that you get back the rights
agreement to sign that says sign this work-for-hire agreement so that we can process your
check.") (internal quotations omitted).
It may be true that artists "assume the risk" of the work for hire doctrine by becoming
professional artists or avoid the inequitable operation of the doctrine by simply choosing
not to enter the industry. The goal of copyright law, however, is to encourage artists to
create and disseminate their works. See supra note 2 (discussing the objectives of copy-
right law). If artists respond to work for hire unfairness by not creating, then the goals of
copyright law are not achieved.
215. Copyright law by itself cannot remedy the fact that artists are disadvantaged in the
open market. See Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18, at 549 (statement of William Pa-
try) ("The real question is not whether the government or the statute can alter the eco-
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A. The Adequacy of the Reid Factors
It is vitally important for a free-lance artist to own the copyright in a
work produced in a work for hire relationship.2 16 Although the artist has
been paid a fee for producing the work, he or she has not necessarily
received the employment benefits traditionally enjoyed by common law
employees, such as insurance, vacation time, or pensions.217 If the artist
is awarded copyright ownership, he or she will be reimbursed for sacrific-
ing the security associated with traditional employment.218
On the other hand, if an artist is truly an employee, it is essential that
the employer receive the benefits of copyright ownership: the employer
has undertaken the risks related to free enterprise and has compensated
the artist for his or her efforts with salary and benefits.2" 9 To preserve
nomics of the marketplace to work-made-for-hire assignments; it is obvious - you
can't."). As applied, however, the law should represent a public policy "default," and
should protect the interests of creative people. See id. Thus, courts should apply copyright
law so that it benefits artists wherever possible. See id; see also Gulick, supra note 7, at 86-
87 (arguing that courts should be concerned with the weakness of artists as a group and
with the inability of individual artists to bargain for rights in their working agreements).
216. See 134 CONG. REC. 28,309 (1988) (statement of Sen. Cochran). According to
Senator Thad Cochran:
The livelihoods of freelance artists, photographers, and writers depend on their
ability to claim "authorship" for the pieces they produce. They build their reputa-
tion, and therefore their ability to attract clients, on the basis of past performance.
Their careers succeed or fail by their skill and style in translating through their
own creative expression the ideas and messages society needs to disseminate.
Id
217. See Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18, at 530 (statement of Irwin Karp). Ac-
cording to Irwin Karp:
[Miost photographers, most illustrators, most indexers, most freelance editors,
translators, etc. don't get to participate in whatever benefit program the publisher
has for its employees; they don't get health insurance; and they don't have social
security taxes paid by the publisher or the software company or whatever; and the
publisher doesn't withhold their income taxes, or pay workmen's compensation
or unemployment taxes for them. They probably have to pay unincorporated
business taxes if they live in New York City. They have to pay commercial occu-
pancy taxes here and elsewhere.
Id.
Employers claim that they are entitled to the copyright in works made for hire because
of their considerable investment of time, skills and money in the works. See Supnik, supra
note 34, at 139.
218. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of copy-
right ownership).
In addition, there is substantial evidence that the drafters of the 1976 Act's work for hire
provision intended to limit the application of § 101(1) to formal, salaried employees. See
Weinberg, supra note 18, at 696-701; see also VARMER, supra note 55, at 130 (noting that
cases decided under the 1909 Act generally were limited to works that salaried employees
created in the course of employment).
219. See Gulick, supra note 7, at 63-64 (arguing that, where a commissioned work is
created at the request, risk, and under the direction of the hiring party, awarding copyright
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this balance, artists and employers alike must be able to predict accu-
rately whether a working relationship will be considered an employment
relationship and whether the work or works eventually created will be
considered for hire.22 Furthermore, because many artists are relatively
unsophisticated in matters of business, the work for hire doctrine should
be applied in such a way as to protect their interests.22' Unfortunately,
the work for hire doctrine as currently applied is not uniform2 2 2 and does
not always favor the interests of creators.
223
ownership to the artist would represent a "windfall"); see also supra note 32 (discussing the
rationale for awarding copyright ownership to employers).
220. See generally Fidlow, supra note 56, at 593-94 (discussing the consequences of
copyright ownership). While it may be true that uncertainty regarding employment status
is tolerated in some areas of the law, including torts and contract, it should not be tolerated
in copyright law. The employment/independent contractor distinction takes on heightened
significance in the copyright area because copyright ownership was expressly provided for
by the Framers of the Constitution. Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Artistic creativity is to be encouraged because it is good for society.
See Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of Innovation: Film
Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1011, 1022 (1988); see
also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 1.03[A], at 44.27 to 44.30. Artistic creativity
will not be encouraged if the economic incentives to create are unpredictable.
221. The Supreme Court noted in Reid that "[a]rtists and photographers are among the
most vulnerable and poorly protected of all of the beneficiaries of the copyright law."
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 747 n.13 (1989) (quoting S.
REP. No. 473, at 4 (1975)).
Applying the work for hire doctrine to protect artists will not frustrate freedom of con-
tract. Cf Beyer, supra note 220, at 1047 n.103 (characterizing as invalid the argument that
artists lack the bargaining power to insist on contractual protection). On the contrary,
contract law traditionally has been applied to protect classes of disadvantaged persons,
including minors, the mentally incompetent, and, occasionally, the intoxicated. See E. AL-
LAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRACTs §§ 4.2-4.8, at 376-99 (2d ed. 1990). Be-
cause Congress has determined that artists generally are "vulnerable and poorly
protected" and because the purpose of copyright law is to promote creativity, it seems
logical that the courts should take into consideration the relatively weak bargaining posi-
tion of artists in society. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 747 n.13.
222. Compare, e.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
the provision of employee benefits and the tax treatment of the employee are the two most
important factors in the Reid analysis), aff'd, 47 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1995), with Respect, Inc. v.
Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1118-19 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (character-
izing the employee benefits and tax treatment factors as "feather[s] in the scales" of the
Reid analysis).
223. Cf Hyde & Hager, supra note 27 (arguing that the trend in copyright decisions is
to favor the interests of artists); compare, e.g., Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238,
1243-44 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding that a computer program created by a laboratory supervi-
sor was a work for hire) with Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar, No. CIV.A.89-4684, 1990 WL
69013, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990) (holding on similar facts that a computer program
created by a professional programmer was not a work for hire).
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The problem lies not with the Reid factors themselves, but with the way
that they are applied. Under Reid, courts classify employment relation-
ships based upon the unique facts of each case. 224 The multi-factor ap-
proach taken in Reid allows courts to apply the factors selectively.225
Depending on which factors a lower court chooses to apply, the Supreme
Court's agency analysis may become highly variable.226 For example, the
right to control is one factor of the Reid test.227 Although no one factor
should be dispositive, the control factor certainly could be accorded a
great deal of weight, making it, in effect, dispositive.228 Yet, allowing the
control factor to become determinative is inconsistent with Reid's rejec-
tion of the control tests, and further, will not favor the interests of cre-
ators as nearly all commissioning parties exercise some degree of control
over the work.229 Other courts, however, might emphasize other factors,
according the control factor little weight.23° Simply by weighing the fac-
tors differently, the Reid test is susceptible to highly contradictory
results.23'
224. See Goldscheid, supra note 17, at 572.
225. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 700 (arguing that the split in the federal courts
over the actual control and right to control tests emphasizes the "interpretive nightmare"
that results from a flexible test such as the agency test); see also supra notes 108-56 and
accompanying text (discussing the various ways courts have weighed and applied the Reid
factors).
226. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 700.
227. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989).
228. See, e.g., MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952
F.2d 769, 776 (3d Cir. 1991). Although the court in MacLean went on to consider each of
the Reid factors, it determined that the hiring party's right to control would be "central to
the resolution" of the employment inquiry. Id.
One case, decided before Reid, was based on an agency law analysis and seems to have
relied solely on the right to control. See Vane v. The Fair, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 133, 135 (E.D.
Tex. 1987), affd sub non. Estate of Vane v. The Fair, Inc., 849 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1988).
In addition, other factors of the Reid analysis are relevant to the control issue. A court
could manipulate those factors to make control the central issue, even though the Supreme
Court expressly rejected such an approach.
229. See Weinberg, supra note 18, at 701 ("The agency law test will allow jockeying by
industries with significant bargaining power to the detriment of creators."). Copyright pro-
tection exists to ensure the continued production and dissemination of valuable works, so
that the public might be enriched and educated. See supra note 2 (discussing the dual
purposes of copyright law). To deprive artists of these privileges when a hiring party exer-
cises some control over the creation of a work may result in a disincentive to creation. See
Works-Made-For-Hire, supra note 18, at 541 (statement of Richard Weisgrau) (arguing
that work for hire "destroys ... [free-lancers's] ability to really exploit and get the eco-
nomic value of [their] works").
230. See supra notes 108-26 and 147-56 and accompanying text (discussing Aymes and
Marco).
231. See supra note 26 (comparing the various results reached by courts under Reid).
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The Reid analysis is also problematic because the Court did not define
"scope of employment., 232 The scope of employment prong of the Reid
test is vital to determining whether a work will be considered for hire.233
Because Reid made use of the Restatement (Second) of Agency for em-
ployment status determinations, the logical choice for scope of employ-
ment determinations also seems to be the Restatement.234 The question
is, however, which section of the Restatement? The most appropriate sec-
tion seems to be 228, which defines "scope of employment. '235 At least
one court has adopted section 228 for scope of employment issues.2 36
That court, however, also relied on section 229 of the Restatement.237
This reliance on section 229 broadened the scope of employment defini-
tion to include a computer program which an employee wrote during his
personal time using his own equipment and for which he was not paid.238
Assuming that the Restatement is relevant to the work for hire frame-
work,239 it should be implemented in a uniform manner, to ensure contin-
ued predictability.24 °
B. The Application of the Reid Factors
The "turbulent weather" currently surrounding work for hire law
springs from the various interpretations lower courts developed in apply-
ing the Reid factors. Agency law should be applied consistently to work
for hire cases to preserve predictability in copyright law, and should also
be applied to maintain work for hire's balancing of interests. 241 Central
232. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing Reid's failure to define
"scope of employment").
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1994) (providing that "a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment [is a work for hire]").
234. See Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987) (sug-
gesting that courts refer to the Restatement (Second) of Agency).
235. See supra note 169 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228).
236. See Miller v. CP Chems., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (D.S.C. 1992); see supra notes
173-88 and accompanying text (discussing the result reached in Miller).
237. See Miller, 808 F. Supp. at 1243-44.
238. See id at 1243-44.
239. But cf supra note 101 (discussing the incompatibility of the Restatement (Second)'s
focus on tort liability with copyright ownership issues).
240. See supra note 56 (discussing the need for predictability in copyright law).
241. See Respect, Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1114
(N.D. Il. 1993). The court in Respect recognized that:
At stake are competing policies - policies that on the one hand support those
whose work (and often creativity) brings a vision to life, as against on the other
hand supporting the organizations without whose funds and supervision (and per-
haps creativity) the final product might never have come to fruition.
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to the issue is an understanding of the benefits associated with copyright
ownership.
1. The Benefits of Copyright Ownership
Consistent with its purposes of enriching public knowledge and com-
pensating artists,242 copyright law grants authors a limited economic mo-
nopoly in their works.243 Essentially, copyright ownership awards certain
exclusive rights that extend beyond a single transaction. Possibly the
most important of these rights are the rights to reproduce, adapt, dis-
tribute, perform, and display copyrighted works.2' These rights endure
for the life of the copyright, which in most cases is the life of the author
plus fifty years.245 The economic value of copyright lies in its monopolis-
tic nature: the copyright owner's rights are exclusive, requiring others
wishing to make use of the work to obtain the owner's permission first.246
The copyright owner may either forbid use of the work or allow the use
of the work, usually in exchange for the payment of a fee.2 47
The economic benefits associated with copyright ownership stretch far
beyond the payment tendered for creation of the work. The wages or
commissions that employees or independent contractors receive repre-
sent one-time payments with concrete value. 248 The economic benefits
connected with copyright ownership, on the other hand, continue for as
long as the term of the copyright and have virtually limitless value.2 49
These economic benefits are an incentive to artistic creation, and thus lie
242. See supra note 2 (discussing the purposes of copyright protection).
243. See supra note 2 (discussing the limited monopoly granted by copyright).
244. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994); DuBoiF, supra note 2, at 185 (noting that these rights
are "[p]erhaps the most important element of profit for creators"). Of course, not all
works receive all of these rights. The right of performance is inapplicable to a visual work
such as a painting or sculpture, for example. See STRONG, supra note 4, at 117-29 (examin-
ing the rights in copyrighted works and noting that performance means either live perform-
ance or "indirect performance by means of electronic broadcasting and similar processes").
245. See 17 U.S.C. § 302. This provision applies only in cases of works created on or
after January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act, and does not apply to works for
hire. See id.
246. See REGISTER's REPORT, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that copyright allows an author
to control a work's reproduction after it has been made available to the public).
247. See id.
248. See Hardy, supra note 32, at 190 (noting that an artist and employer may settle on
a concrete price for use of a work, and that unforeseen uses of the work may have much
greater value).
249. Although an unknown artist's copyright may have little value, as his or her reputa-
tion grows, his or her licensing fees, royalties, and performance fees will grow proportion-
ately. The future value of copyright ownership is diminished somewhat because it involves
some risk and because of economic concepts such as future value and inflation. Further-
more, few artists achieve the level of fame that would make copyright ownership truly
profitable.
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at the heart of copyright law itself.250 Work for hire law shifts these bene-
fits to the employer to compensate the employer for undertaking en-
trepreneurial risk.251 When the artist-employee has been compensated
properly, he or she will continue to produce art works for the employer,
at the employer's direction, and the purposes of copyright law are
achieved.252 If, however, the artist has not been compensated properly,
as when the artist receives a flat fee for preparation of the work, and is
forced to forego copyright ownership because of the operation of the
250. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 7, at 16 (stating that by guaranteeing fair
compensation for authors, copyright encourages the creation and dissemination of intellec-
tual works and allows publishers and distributors to circulate those works in the market).
In addition to economic benefits, copyright ownership also entails certain valuable non-
economic rights. Although the European concept of droit moral has not been accepted in
United States law, the courts have recognized some rights closely akin to moral rights in
connection with copyright. See NORWICK & CHASEN, supra note 8, at 48-49 (discussing
moral rights theory). These rights include the right of first publication, which is similar to
the moral right of divulgation. See id.; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985) (stating that "[p]ublication of an author's expression before he has
authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and
whether it will be made public"). The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) extends
additional moral rights to certain works of visual art, including rights of attribution and
integrity. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (1994). Because the limited moral rights implied
from copyright law depend on copyright ownership, the artist in a work for hire relation-
ship does not receive them. See NORWICK & CHASEN, supra note 8, at 49-51. VARA
specifically exempts works for hire from its protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. These non-
economic benefits further compensate either employers or artists for undertaking creative
risks. See Gulick, supra note 7, at 56 (stating that "contract payments compensate for only
some of the benefits of copyright ownership," and arguing that certain moral rights repre-
sent additional benefits which should belong to the creator in a work for hire relationship).
251. See REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 (declaring that the work for hire doc-
trine is based on the fact that because the employee is paid for the work, while the em-
ployer bears the commercial risk, the employer should be entitled to any profits realized
from the work); see also supra note 32 (discussing the interests of artists and employers in
copyright ownership).
252. See David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 421 (1983). Ladd argues that:
By limiting potential rewards in the copyright market - whether by capping
them with a compulsory license, or barring them with a complete exemption, or
refusing to extend copyright to new uses, or curtailing them in any way under
arguments of "harm" - the entrepreneurial calculus which precedes risk-taking
in authorship and publishing is shifted in the direction of not taking a chance, i.e.,
not writing or publishing a "risky" work, whether ideologically or economically
risky.
Id. at 431.
Although Ladd did not directly address the work for hire issue, his argument is particu-
larly relevant in that context. An artist who is unsure of being fairly compensated, whether
through the benefits of copyright ownership or through employment earnings, is less likely
to risk creating a work. See Randall K. Filer, The "Starving Artist" - Myth or Reality?
Earnings of Artists in the United States, 94 J. POL. ECON. 56, 73-74 (1968) (asserting that
artists are "normal, risk-averse, income-seeking individuals just like the rest of us").
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work for hire doctrine, the incentive to create is diminished.25 Thus,
when the work for hire doctrine is applied without concern for the bal-
ancing of employers' and artists' interests, the purpose of copyright is un-
dermined and fewer creative works are produced. The challenge is to
apply the agency factors enunciated in Reid with due regard for those
interests.
2. The Correct Application of the Reid Factors
The Reid factors themselves contain the ideal balancing of employers'
and artists' interests. 254 Essentially, each of the factors relates either to
the control exercised over the creation of the work or to the benefits
provided in connection with the creation of the work. The best way to
apply the Reid test, to protect the interests of both creators and employ-
ers, is to balance the control factors with the benefits factors. If, in a
given case, numerous control factors favor the hiring party, and the hiring
party has provided employment benefits to the artist, an employment re-
lationship exists and the employer is entitled to copyright ownership. If,
however, numerous control factors favor the artist, and the artist has not
received employment benefits, the artist should receive copyright owner-
ship. This interpretation of Reid will protect the interests of both em-
ployers and artists, and will further the purposes of copyright by
promoting certainty in the work for hire formulation.
It should be recalled, however, that another goal of copyright protec-
tion is to reward artists fairly for their efforts.255 Thus, in applying the
Reid test, courts should consider the generally inferior bargaining posi-
tion of artists. Although it has been argued that artists may best protect
their interest by contracting with hiring parties,256 this argument fails to
253. See supra note 252 (arguing that artists and employers will not produce works for
public use if compensation for the works is uncertain).
254. Cf. Weinberg, supra note 18, at 699-700 (characterizing the agency test as no more
than a revision of the control tests rejected in Reid).
255. See supra note 2 (discussing copyright's goal of compensating artists for their crea-
tive work).
256. See, e.g., Luria & Butzel, supra note 27, at S21 (arguing that it is vitally important
that employers, employees, and independent contractors memorialize their rights in writ-
ing). One commentator has argued that artists are motivated by economic considerations.
Filer, supra note 252, at 73-74; see also Jennifer T. Olsson, Note, Rights in Fine Art Photog-
raphy: Through a Lens Darkly, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1489, 1501 (1992) ("Most economic theory
assumes the actors are rational, profit-maximizing creatures; this has been called the core
of copyright doctrine.") (internal quotations omitted).
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acknowledge the disadvantaged bargaining position that artists frequently
occupy.257 Courts should apply Reid with due regard for this problem.2 58
V. CONCLUSION
The confusion in work for hire law is a serious problem. The courts
have not applied Reid uniformly, and artists in different jurisdictions cur-
rently receive varying amounts of protection. If artists are motivated by
economic considerations, it is conceivable that some artists will be reluc-
tant to enter into agreements that could be considered work for hire rela-
tionships. As alternate sources of funding continue to shrink, it is
especially important that copyright law serves the important purpose of
encouraging the creation and dissemination of art.
Although Reid represented a step in the right direction, the Supreme
Court allowed the lower courts to exercise too much freedom in applying
the agency law analysis. The Court also erred by not instructing the
courts on how to delineate the scope of employment for artists who have
created works arguably related to their employment.
To resolve the confusion in the work for hire area, the courts should
adopt the interpretation of the Reid balancing test suggested in this Com-
ment. The scope of employment should be determined with reference to
section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, but should also take
into account copyright's goal of protecting artists. With this guidance,
artists will be able to make better informed choices regarding work rela-
tionships, and employers will be able to make better hiring determina-
tions. This new certainty in the work for hire area will lead to enhanced
creativity in the arts and will prevent decreased productivity. Most im-
257. See 134 CONG. REc. 14,561 (1988) (statement of Sen. Cochran). Senator Cochran
has argued that:
[M]any creative artists since the 1976 Copyright Act went into effect have been
on the losing end of work for hire cases, even when they operate as independent
contractors and decline to sign work for hire agreements .... It is important to
recognize that most independent artists, photographers, or writers working in
highly competitive fields simply cannot negotiate effectively with corporate art
buyers.... By cutting creators off from potential reuse fees and control of their
work, work for hire makes it unlikely that their bargaining positions will be
strengthened as their careers progress.
Id.
258. It is especially important at this time that courts, by properly enforcing the work
for hire doctrine, seek to ensure fair compensation for artists, as government-sponsored
funding of the arts is being drastically cut back. See generally Jane Ludlam, NEA Faces
Abolition This Fall, PoErs & WRrrERS MAG., July/Aug. 1995, at 7 (stating that the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts faces severe budget cuts, and that funding for the arts has
never been more threatened).
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portantly, certainty will promote the goals of copyright law by protecting
the rights of artists and promoting continued artistic growth.
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